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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges 
SLOVITER, SCIRICA, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, 
JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, join,  and AMBRO joins as to 
Part III only. 
 
 Ruben Mitchell was indicted on one count of 
attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine.  
Following Mitchell‘s indictment, arrest, and detention, the 
  4 
Government sought to collect a DNA sample.  The 
Government relied on 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A), which 
permits the collection of DNA samples from ―individuals 
who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted.‖  Mitchell 
objected, arguing that the statute violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  Agreeing with Mitchell, the District Court 
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and prohibited 
the Government from taking a DNA sample from Mitchell 
prior to conviction. 
 
 As a threshold matter, we address whether we possess 
appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal by the 
Government.  We conclude that this appeal falls within the 
narrow class of orders immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine enunciated in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).  Turning to 
the merits, we apply a ―totality of the circumstances‖ test, 
balancing the intrusion on Mitchell‘s privacy against the 
Government‘s interest in the collection and testing of his 
DNA.  United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 
(2001).  As arrestees have a diminished expectation of 
privacy in their identities, and DNA collection from arrestees 
serves important law enforcement interests, we conclude that 
such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, we will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
 Mitchell was indicted on a single count of attempted 
possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Thereafter, he was 
arrested and placed in pretrial detention.  At Mitchell‘s initial 
appearance before a Magistrate Judge, the Government 
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sought to collect a sample of Mitchell‘s DNA1 pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A)
2
 and its implementing regulation, 
28 C.F.R. § 28.12.  The statute, as amended in 2006, permits 
the collection of DNA samples from ―individuals who are 
arrested, facing charges, or convicted.‖  42 U.S.C. § 
14135a(a)(1)(A).  Mitchell objected, arguing that the statute 
violated the Fourth Amendment; the Magistrate Judge 
ordered briefing and stayed the collection of Mitchell‘s DNA 
pending resolution by the District Court.  Prior to the 
resolution of the DNA issue, the District Court held a 
detention hearing and detained Mitchell pending trial. 
 
 In a Memorandum Opinion, the District Court held 
that § 14135a(a)(1)(A) and its implementing regulation 
violate the Fourth Amendment insofar as they permit the 
warrantless collection of DNA from individuals who have not 
been convicted of a crime.  Applying a ―totality of the 
circumstances‖ analysis, the District Court assessed ―‗on the 
one hand, the degree to which [the DNA collection] intrudes 
upon an individual‘s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.‘‖  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 
                                                          
1
 ―DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid.  DNA molecules 
carry the genetic information of human beings.  DNA is 
unique to each individual, except in the case of identical 
twins.‖  United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 181 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 
2
 Section 14135a was enacted as part of the DNA Analysis 
Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.  We will refer to this Act 
and all subsequent versions of the statute as the ―DNA Act.‖ 
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843, 848 (2006) (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19).  
Considering Mitchell‘s status as an arrestee and a pretrial 
detainee, the District Court held that ―Mitchell has a 
diminished expectation of privacy in his identity‖ and thus 
may be subjected to routine booking procedures such as 
fingerprinting.  United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 
597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009).  Nevertheless, the District Court 
declined to equate ―the fingerprinting process and the 
resulting identification information obtained therefrom with 
DNA profiling‖ given ―the complex, comprehensive, 
inherently private information contained in a DNA sample.‖  
Id.  ―The extraction of DNA,‖ the District Court reasoned, ―is 
much more than a mere progression [from] taking fingerprints 
and photographs[;] it represents a quantum leap that is 
entirely unnecessary for identification purposes.‖  Id. at 608–
09.  As a result, the District Court concluded that while taking 
the DNA sample ―may not be unreasonably intrusive, the 
search of the sample is quite intrusive, severely affecting 
Mitchell‘s expectation of privacy in his most intimate 
matters.‖  Id. at 609. 
 
 With respect to the Government‘s interests, the District 
Court determined that there was no compelling need to take 
Mitchell‘s DNA sample for identification purposes.  While 
collecting DNA also serves investigative purposes, ―there 
[was] no exigency that support[ed] the collection of DNA 
from an arrestee or pretrial detainee‖ as opposed to waiting 
until after a conviction or obtaining a proper search warrant.  
Id. at 610.  Accordingly, weighing Mitchell‘s privacy 
interests against the Government‘s legitimate interests, the 
District Court concluded that the universal collection of DNA 
samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees was 
unreasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.  In 
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the accompanying Order, the District Court prohibited the 
Government from collecting a DNA sample from Mitchell 
―until such time as he has been convicted of the offense set 
forth in the indictment.‖  Id. at 611.  The Government sought 
reconsideration, which was denied. 
 
 The Government timely appealed and expressed an 
interest in expediting the appeal.  We ordered the parties to 
address both the request to expedite and the jurisdictional 
basis for the appeal in their motion and response.
3
  Following 
the parties‘ submissions, we granted the Government‘s 
request to expedite and directed the parties to address the 
issue of our subject matter jurisdiction in their merits briefs.  
A three-judge panel heard oral argument; however, while the 
case was under consideration, it was determined that the case 
should be heard en banc pursuant to Third Circuit Internal 
Operating Procedure 9.4.1. 
 
 This appeal presents two issues:  (1) whether the 
District Court‘s decision is immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine, and, if so, (2) whether the collection 
                                                          
3
 Mitchell was originally represented by the Federal Public 
Defender (―FPD‖).  On November 19, 2010, the District 
Court granted the FPD‘s motion to withdraw as counsel and 
issued an order appointing attorney John A. Knorr to 
represent Mitchell.  Subsequently, this Court also terminated 
the FPD‘s representation and appointed Knorr to represent 
Mitchell on appeal.  We then appointed the FPD as amicus 
curiae on the basis that the issues in the case had the potential 
to affect other defendants. 
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of DNA from arrestees and pretrial detainees violates the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
II. 
  
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  Mitchell contests our jurisdiction.  ―We 
necessarily exercise de novo review over an argument 
alleging a lack of appellate jurisdiction.‖4  Reilly v. City of 
Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2008).  Our standard 
of review of the District Court‘s resolution of Mitchell‘s 
Fourth Amendment claim is likewise de novo.  United States 
v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
III. 
 
 Mitchell asserts that we cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over the present appeal by the Government.  He argues first 
that the Government lacks statutory authority under the 
Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, to appeal from the 
District Court‘s adverse ruling in this criminal case.  Second, 
he contends that this appeal does not fall within the collateral 
order doctrine.  We address each of Mitchell‘s arguments in 
turn. 
 
A.  Criminal Appeals Act 
 
 Mitchell correctly cites the well-established rule that 
―‗an appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not 
                                                          
4
 To the extent that we have jurisdiction, we exercise it under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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favored and must be based upon express statutory authority.‘‖  
United States v. Farnsworth, 456 F.3d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 
2006) (quoting United States v. Gilchrist, 215 F.3d 333, 335–
36 (3d Cir. 2000)).  In general, the United States may appeal 
in a criminal case only as permitted by the Criminal Appeals 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which limits appeals to cases 
involving the dismissal of charges, suppression or exclusion 
of evidence, return of seized property, or release of a 
defendant.
5  
 
 Neither party argues that the present appeal falls into 
one of the categories of orders appealable pursuant to § 3731.  
Mitchell contends that this alone resolves the question and 
strips us of jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court has concluded to 
the contrary, however, holding that in certain limited 
instances, ―orders relating to a criminal case may be found to 
possess sufficient independence from the main course of the 
prosecution to warrant treatment as plenary orders, and thus 
be appealable on the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 without 
regard to the limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 3731.‖  Carroll v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 394, 403 (1957).  In other words, 
while the Government must have express statutory authority 
to appeal in a criminal case, there are two statutes that 
provide this authority:  (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3731, for a 
circumscribed list of orders; and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1291, for 
collateral orders.  The appeal of a collateral order by the 
Government is thus an exception to the strictures of § 3731.  
See United States v. Ferri, 686 F.2d 147, 150–52 (3d Cir. 
1982) (examining whether jurisdiction was proper under the 
collateral order doctrine of § 1291 after the Government 
                                                          
5
 The Government may also seek appellate review of a 
sentence as delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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conceded that jurisdiction was lacking under § 3731); United 
States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(same); United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 
2005) (deciding whether ―the appeal is sufficiently 
independent from [the defendant‘s] underlying criminal case 
to make it one of the few criminal appeals permitted under 
section 1291‖); United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 768 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (holding that ―under what we choose to call the 
‗special circumstance‘ exception, a government appeal may 
be entertained in a criminal case on the authority of section 
1291 if the appeal satisfies the conditions of the so-called 
collateral order doctrine‖).  This authority makes clear that 
even though the challenged order is not appealable under § 
3731, the Government may still maintain this appeal if the 
order qualifies as collateral. 
 
B.  Collateral Order Doctrine 
 
 The final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 limits the 
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review of ―final 
decisions of the district courts.‖  Section 1291 ―[o]rdinarily . . 
. ‗prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition 
of sentence‘ in a criminal case.‖  United States v. Wecht, 537 
F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Flanagan v. United 
States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984)).  In Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), the 
Supreme Court applied a ―practical rather than a technical 
construction‖ to § 1291 and carved out a narrow exception to 
the final judgment rule, which has come to be known as the 
collateral order doctrine.  This exception deems as ―final 
judgments‖ those decisions that, while they do not end the 
litigation on the merits, ―finally determine claims of right 
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, 
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too important to be denied review and too independent of the 
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred 
until the whole case is adjudicated.‖  Id.  Thereafter, in 
Carroll, 354 U.S. at 403, the Supreme Court held that the 
collateral order doctrine was applicable in criminal cases to 
orders ―possess[ing] sufficient independence from the main 
course of the prosecution.‖ 
 
 ―To come within the ‗small class‘ of decisions 
excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen,‖ an order 
must (1) ―conclusively determine the disputed question,‖ (2) 
―resolve an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action,‖ and (3) ―be effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.‖  Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); accord Sell v. United 
States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003) (applying the Cohen test in a 
criminal case); Wecht, 537 F.3d at 228.  All three of these 
requirements must be met for an order to qualify as collateral.  
We, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 324 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
 We have ―consistently construed the collateral order 
exception narrowly lest the exception swallow up the salutary 
general rule that only final orders be appealed.  Moreover, 
strict construction of the collateral order doctrine is consistent 
with the longstanding congressional policy against piecemeal 
appeals that underlies the final judgment rule.‖  Id. at 324–25 
(internal quotation marks & citations omitted).  In criminal 
cases, ―[b]ecause of the compelling interest in prompt trials, 
the [Supreme] Court has interpreted the requirements of the 
collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule with the 
utmost strictness in criminal cases.‖  Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 
265; accord Gov’t of the V.I. v. Rivera, 333 F.3d 143, 150 
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n.16 (3d Cir. 2003).  To be appealable under the collateral 
order doctrine, a pretrial order in a criminal case must involve 
―an asserted right the legal and practical value of which 
would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.‖  
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265 (internal quotation marks & 
citations omitted). 
 
 As the Supreme Court has instructed, ―[t]o guard 
against the temptation to expand the doctrine‘s reach, . . . ‗the 
issue of appealability under § 1291 is to be determined for the 
entire category to which a claim belongs.‘  This approach 
reflects the Court‘s insistence that the finality requirement of 
§ 1291 must not be reduced to a case-by-case determination . 
. . .‖  We, 174 F.3d at 325 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)) (further 
citation omitted); accord Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, --
- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606–09 (2009) (declining to classify 
disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege as 
collateral in part because the interest protected by the 
privilege did not ―justify the cost of allowing immediate 
appeal of the entire class of relevant orders‖).  As the 
Supreme Court recently stated: 
 
The justification for immediate appeal must . . . 
be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual 
benefits of deferring appeal until litigation 
concludes.  This requirement finds expression 
in two of the three traditional Cohen conditions.  
The second condition insists upon important 
questions separate from the merits.  More 
significantly, the third Cohen question, whether 
a right is adequately vindicable or effectively 
reviewable, simply cannot be answered without 
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a judgment about the value of the interests that 
would be lost through rigorous application of a 
final judgment requirement.  That a ruling may 
burden litigants in ways that are only 
imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a 
final district court judgment . . . has never 
sufficed.  Instead, the decisive consideration is 
whether delaying review until the entry of final 
judgment would imperil a substantial public 
interest or some particular value of a high order. 
 
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 605 (internal quotation marks & 
citations omitted). 
 
 The first requirement of the collateral order doctrine is 
that the order must ―conclusively determine the disputed 
question.‖  Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.  ―We cannot 
review any decision that is ‗tentative, informal, or 
incomplete.‘‖  Wecht, 537 F.3d at 230 (quoting Cohen, 337 
U.S. at 546).  Both parties agree that the District Court‘s 
Orders granting Mitchell‘s motion and denying the 
Government‘s motion for reconsideration conclusively 
determined a disputed question. 
 
 The parties, however, contest the scope and phrasing 
of the disputed question, a disagreement that ultimately does 
not affect our conclusion as to whether the first element of the 
Cohen test is satisfied.  According to Mitchell, the 
Government ―mischaracterizes the issue in this appeal too 
broadly and obscures the right at stake when it says that ‗the 
disputed question [is] whether § 14135a(a)(1)(A) . . . 
comport[s] with the Fourth Amendment and thus whether 
Mitchell[,] as a pre-trial detainee, has a legal right to avoid 
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forced collection of a DNA sample.‘‖  (Mitchell Br. 15 
(quoting Gov‘t Br. 13).)  Mitchell‘s argument is correct 
insofar as the precise issue at stake is actually the 
Government’s authority to collect a DNA sample from a 
pretrial detainee under federal law and not Mitchell’s right to 
be free from such collection.  But this is a distinction without 
a difference.  Ultimately, the District Court concluded that 
―42 U.S.C. § 14135a, and its accompanying regulations, 
requiring a charged defendant to submit a DNA sample for 
analysis and inclusion in [the Combined DNA Index System]
6
 
without independent suspicion or a warrant[,] unreasonably 
intrude[] on such defendant‘s expectation of privacy and [are] 
invalid under the Fourth Amendment.‖  Mitchell, 681 F. 
Supp. 2d at 611.  Thus, the District Court conclusively 
determined that § 14135a violates the Fourth Amendment 
insofar as it permits the collection of a DNA sample from an 
arrestee or a pretrial detainee.  Moreover, it denied the 
Government‘s motion for reconsideration, confirming that the 
District Court does not intend to further address the 
constitutionality of the DNA Act with respect to arrestees and 
pretrial detainees.  See Wecht, 537 F.3d at 230 n.14; United 
States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding 
that order was conclusive when ―there [was] no possibility . . 
. that, depending upon future events, the district court might 
reconsider its position‖). 
 
 Ultimately, the District Court conclusively decided a 
question of constitutional law.  The District Court prohibited 
the Government from exercising its authority pursuant to 
§ 14135a and its implementing regulation to collect a DNA 
                                                          
6
 Throughout this opinion we will also refer to the ―Combined 
DNA Index System‖ by its acronym, CODIS.   
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sample from Mitchell because, in the court‘s view, such 
collection would violate Mitchell‘s Fourth Amendment rights.  
As such, the orders at issue here satisfy the first requirement 
of the collateral order doctrine. 
 
 The second requirement is that the order ―resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action.‖  Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.  ―This is 
sometimes divided into two sub-requirements:  (a) the issue 
must be important; and (b) the issue must be completely 
separate from the merits of the action.‖  Wecht, 537 F.3d at 
230.  With respect to the first sub-requirement, ―[t]he 
Supreme Court has defined an important issue as one 
involving interests that are weightier than the societal 
interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final 
judgment principles or one that is serious and unsettled.‖  Id. 
at 230–31 (internal quotation marks & citations omitted); 
accord Pierce v. Blaine, 467 F.3d 362, 370–71 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(―[A]n issue is important if the interests that would potentially 
go unprotected without immediate appellate review are 
significant relative to efficiency interests sought to be 
advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.‖ (internal 
quotation marks & citation omitted)).  In other words, the 
issue must be ―important in a jurisprudential sense.‖  Christy 
v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Praxis 
Props., Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 56 (3d Cir. 
1991)). 
 
 It is true, as Mitchell argues, that in many criminal 
cases holding that interlocutory review was warranted, the 
important issue at stake involved the rights of the defendant.  
See, e.g., Sell, 539 U.S. at 176 (concluding that defendant‘s 
right to avoid forced medication is important); Abney v. 
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United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (concluding that 
defendant‘s right to avoid trial on double jeopardy grounds is 
important).  Yet other cases have held that interests asserted 
by the Government or by the public at large are sufficiently 
important to merit interlocutory review.  See, e.g., Whittaker, 
268 F.3d at 192 (order disqualifying United States Attorney 
for Eastern District of Pennsylvania); United States v. 
Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 592 (3d Cir. 1992) (order prohibiting 
federal law enforcement agents from arresting subject of valid 
arrest warrant). 
 
 The interest asserted by the Government in the present 
case—exercising its statutory authority to collect a DNA 
sample from an arrestee or a pretrial detainee—is similarly 
important.  Congress passed a statute permitting such 
collection, and the Attorney General promulgated regulations 
directing it.  Vindicating the intent of Congress and the 
Attorney General can be jurisprudentially important.  Cf. 
Praxis Props., 947 F.2d at 56 (resolving meaning of federal 
statute jurisprudentially ―important‖ under Cohen).  
Moreover, the Government‘s interest in conducting 
reasonable searches for law enforcement purposes and 
individuals‘ rights to be free from unreasonable searches, like 
issues of ―involuntary medical treatment,‖ ―raise[] questions 
of clear constitutional importance.‖  Sell, 539 U.S. at 176.  
Mitchell argues that the Government‘s interest in obtaining a 
DNA sample before trial is not sufficiently weighty as it is 
merely a matter of timing given that the Government will be 
able to collect Mitchell‘s DNA upon conviction.  As we 
discuss in the following section, the interests implicated in 
  17 
pretrial collection of DNA, however, are not fully satisfied 
through post-trial collection.
7
 
 
 The second sub-requirement, that the issue be 
completely separate from the merits, ―derives from the 
principle that there should not be piecemeal review of issues 
that will later merge with the final judgment and thus require 
the court to review the same issue twice.‖  Santtini, 963 F.2d 
at 592 (citing Praxis Props., 947 F.2d at 56–57).  The merits 
of the present action are Mitchell‘s guilt or innocence of the 
offense of attempted possession with intent to distribute five 
or more kilograms of cocaine.  Whether the Government may 
collect Mitchell‘s DNA prior to conviction is entirely distinct 
from the underlying criminal prosecution. 
 
                                                          
7
 Mitchell further argues that the Government does not have 
an important interest in the pretrial collection of DNA 
samples as it ―does not have the capacity to analyze DNA 
samples in a timely manner, as evidenced by the hundreds of 
thousands of DNA samples collected but not yet analyzed.‖  
(Mitchell Br. 21.)  The report cited by Mitchell in support of 
this contention, however, discusses the backlog in analysis of 
DNA samples collected by the states in state and local 
laboratories and has no bearing on the FBI‘s analysis of 
samples collected from federal pretrial detainees.  See U.S. 
Dep‘t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., Audit Report 
No. 09-23, Audit of the Convicted Offender DNA Backlog 
Reduction Program i–iv (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/a0923/final.pdf.  
Moreover, ―the national backlog of convicted offender 
samples awaiting analysis [in state laboratories] has 
declined.‖  Id. at viii. 
  18 
 The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 104–05 (2d Cir. 
2005), a case that involved the collection of a DNA sample 
pursuant to conviction.  After Peterson was released on 
probation, he received a letter from the United States 
Probation Office directing him to appear to submit a blood 
sample for DNA testing.  394 F.3d at 100–01.  Peterson 
refused, arguing that his conviction was not a qualifying 
offense under the statute,
8
 and the Government petitioned the 
district court to summon Peterson to a violation hearing.  Id. 
at 101.  The district court dismissed the petition, concluding 
that Peterson‘s offense was not a qualifying offense under the 
statute and that Peterson had not violated any conditions of 
probation.  Id.  On appeal, the Second Circuit held that it had 
jurisdiction to review the order dismissing the petition under 
the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 104–05.  The court 
reasoned that the ―determination that Peterson did not violate 
the terms of his probation had nothing to do with the merits of 
Peterson‘s criminal conviction.  All the District Court decided 
was the purely legal question whether Peterson‘s conviction 
for bank larceny required him to submit to the collection of a 
DNA sample.‖  Id.  Furthermore, ―[n]othing the District 
Court could have done in response to the government‘s 
petition would in any way have affected, or even called into 
question, the validity of Peterson‘s underlying conviction or 
the validity of the sentence imposed by the District Court.‖  
Id. at 105. 
 
                                                          
8
 Contested in Peterson was the version of the DNA Act that 
existed in 2002.  The DNA Act has subsequently been 
amended to make ―any felony‖ a qualifying offense.  Pub. L. 
No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (Oct. 30, 2004). 
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 In Peterson, the issue of whether the Government was 
permitted to take a DNA sample arose after his trial and 
conviction, whereas here, the question has been raised before 
trial.  This difference in when the DNA was sought is, 
however, inconsequential in this case at least, because in both 
circumstances the legal issue ―ha[s] nothing to do with the 
merits of‖ the criminal case.  Accordingly, the challenged 
order is ―‗truly collateral.‘‖  Id. (quoting Abney, 431 U.S. at 
660). 
 
 Mitchell argues to the contrary, contending that the 
question of pretrial collection of his DNA ―is inextricably tied 
to the merits of [his] prosecution‖ as the Government could 
use ―the DNA as a crime-solving-prosecutory-tool in the case 
against [him].‖  (Mitchell Br. 25.)  This argument, however, 
misconstrues the nature of the search at issue in this appeal.  
The statute and regulation pursuant to which the Government 
sought Mitchell‘s DNA allow for the suspicionless collection 
of DNA samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees for 
purposes of identification.  Nothing in the record 
demonstrates that Mitchell‘s DNA will be an issue at trial or 
that the Government intends to compare Mitchell‘s DNA 
sample to DNA evidence collected from a crime scene.  
Moreover, if in fact, the present case did involve DNA 
evidence from a crime scene, and the Government wished to 
compare Mitchell‘s DNA to the DNA evidence left at the 
scene, it would have to obtain a warrant to collect Mitchell‘s 
DNA for purposes of comparing the two.
9
  Instead, the 
                                                          
9
 In this respect, we disagree with the dissent‘s 
characterization of the Government‘s interest as using the 
DNA sample to ―ascertain the defendant‘s identity as it 
relates to the guilt or innocence of the crime he is currently 
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Government seeks Mitchell‘s DNA sample as directed by 28 
C.F.R. § 28.12, which mandates such collection from 
individuals who are arrested or facing charges.  Whether the 
Government is constitutionally allowed to do so without 
suspicion is a question completely separate from the issue of 
Mitchell‘s guilt or innocence. 
 
 The third requirement of the collateral order doctrine is 
that the order must ―be effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment.‖  Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 
468.  The relevant inquiry is whether the issue presented is in 
―danger of becoming moot upon conviction and sentence.‖  
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266; accord United States v. Fisher, 
871 F.2d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 1989).  ―[T]he decisive 
consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of 
final judgment ‗would imperil a substantial public interest‘ or 
‗some particular value of a high order.‘‖  Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 
at 605 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352–53 
(2006)). 
 
 As the Supreme Court has recently held, ―[t]he crucial 
question . . . is not whether an interest is important in the 
abstract; it is whether deferring review until final judgment so 
imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing 
immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders.‖  
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 606.  The question presented in this 
appeal would clearly become moot upon final judgment.  If 
Mitchell is convicted, the Government will be able to collect 
                                                                                                                                  
being charged with.‖  (Dissenting Op. at 9).  Again, the 
identity of the arrestee, that is whether this person is actually 
Ruben Mitchell, is completely distinct from any questions of 
guilt or innocence. 
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his DNA pursuant to a different provision of the DNA Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(B), which mandates collection from 
―each individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who 
is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense.‖  
Possession with intent to distribute cocaine is a qualifying 
federal offense under the statute.  See id. § 14135a(d)(1).  
Collection of DNA samples from convicted felons has been 
upheld as constitutional by every circuit court to have 
considered the issue.  See, e.g.,  Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 
F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 
674 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2007); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 
2007); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175; Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).  On the other 
hand, if Mitchell is acquitted, the Government will have no 
right to collect his DNA.  In either case, the Government‘s 
statutory authority to collect DNA from an arrestee or a 
pretrial detainee would not be before the Court. 
 
 The Government has no other opportunity during the 
trial to seek to vindicate its statutory authority.  Thus, the 
Government‘s interest in collecting DNA from pretrial 
detainees ―is not adequately redressable on appeal after final 
judgment, regardless of the trial‘s outcome.‖  Wecht, 537 F.3d 
at 229; see also Whittaker, 268 F.3d at 193 (holding that an 
order disqualifying an entire United States Attorney‘s Office 
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from prosecuting a criminal case is not effectively reviewable 
on appeal).
10
 
 
 Moreover, the Government‘s authority to collect DNA 
pre-trial is not adequately vindicated through post-conviction 
collection.  In Wecht, we held that an order denying the media 
access to the names of prospective jurors was immediately 
reviewable as a collateral order.  537 F.3d at 227.  We 
rejected the suggestion that post-trial release of such 
information would ―vindicate the public‘s asserted right of 
access,‖ reasoning that ―[a]lthough post-trial release of 
information may be better than none at all, the value of the 
right of access would be seriously undermined if it could not 
be contemporaneous.‖  Id. at 229.  Thus, we concluded that 
―the value of contemporaneous disclosure, as opposed to 
post-trial disclosure, is significant enough to justify our 
immediate review of the matter under the collateral order 
doctrine.‖  Id.  Similarly, allowing the Government to collect 
a DNA sample from Mitchell post-trial would better serve the 
                                                          
10
 Mitchell cites Mohawk to argue that interlocutory review is 
inappropriate because the District Court‘s Order does not ―so 
imperil[] the [G]overnment‘s interest in collecting [his] DNA 
so as to justify the cost of allowing the immediate appeal of a 
whole class of similar orders.‖  (Mitchell Br. 24 (citing 
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 605))  Even assuming that our decision 
would permit a whole ―class‖ of orders relating to DNA 
collection to be subject to interlocutory review, these classes 
are ultimately circumscribed and would accord with our 
policy of allowing collateral order review in criminal cases 
only ―sparingly.‖  Rivera, 333 F.3d at 150 n.16.  As such, 
collateral order review in the present case is consistent with 
Mohawk. 
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Government‘s interest than forbidding all such collection.  
Nevertheless, as will become clear in the following section, 
the value to the Government of pre-trial collection, rather 
than post-conviction collection, is sufficiently distinct to 
merit interlocutory review. 
 
 In sum, the District Court‘s Order prohibiting the 
pretrial collection of a DNA sample from Mitchell is subject 
to collateral order review.  We are mindful of the Supreme 
Court‘s instruction in Flanagan that in criminal cases, ―the 
requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final 
judgment rule [must be interpreted] with the utmost 
strictness.‖  465 U.S. at 265.  At bottom, the Flanagan Court 
was concerned about the policy of finality, which ―is at its 
strongest in the field of criminal law.‖  Id. at 264 (quoting 
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 
265 (1982)).  Yet our decision to exercise immediate review 
does not harm the finality of Mitchell‘s criminal case.  
Regardless of the outcome of this appeal, Mitchell‘s trial will 
proceed unaffected.  As the Supreme Court has held, ―matters 
embraced in [a] trial court‘s pretrial order . . . are truly 
collateral to the criminal prosecution itself [when] they will 
not ‗affect, or . . . be affected by, decision of the merits of 
th[e] case.‘‖  Abney, 431 U.S. at 660 (quoting Cohen, 337 
U.S. at 546); see also United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 
422 (5th Cir. 2000) (exercising collateral review of a gag 
order, as such review would have no impact on the criminal 
trial).  Accordingly, our exercise of jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine is consistent 
with the policy of finality. 
 
IV. 
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A.  The DNA Act 
 
 The statute challenged by Mitchell is the latest and 
most far-reaching version of the DNA Act.  In 1994, 
Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act (―Crime Control Act‖), Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
13701–14223), which authorized the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (―FBI‖) to establish an index of DNA samples.  
Pursuant to this authority, the FBI created the Combined 
DNA Index System (―CODIS‖), which ―allows State and 
local forensics laboratories to exchange and compare DNA 
profiles electronically in an attempt to link evidence from 
crime scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples 
of convicted offenders on file in the system.‖  H.R. Rep. 106-
900(I), at 8 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 
2324. 
 
 Thereafter, in 2000, Congress enacted the DNA Act, 
which required the collection of a DNA sample ―from each 
individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or 
has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense‖ and from 
each ―individual on probation, parole, or supervised release.‖  
Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3(a)(1) & (2), 114 Stat. 2726, 2728 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1) & (2)).  
Pursuant to the DNA Act, ―[t]he Attorney General, the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or the probation office 
responsible . . . may use or authorize the use of such means as 
are reasonably necessary to detain, restrain, and collect a 
DNA sample from an individual who refuses to cooperate in 
the collection of the sample.‖  42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4)(A).  
Moreover, ―[a]n individual from whom the collection of a 
DNA sample is authorized under this subsection who fails to 
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cooperate in the collection of that sample shall be . . . guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor.‖  Id. § 14135a(a)(5)(A).  Once the 
DNA sample is collected, the collection kit is forwarded to 
the FBI for analysis and inclusion in CODIS.  Id. § 
14135a(b). 
 
 The DNA Act includes a number of safeguards to 
prevent the improper use of DNA samples.  First, the Act 
explicitly restricts the use of DNA test results to the purposes 
specified in the Crime Control Act.  Id. § 14135e(b).  The 
Crime Control Act limits disclosure ―to criminal justice 
agencies for law enforcement identification purposes;‖ ―in 
judicial proceedings, if otherwise admissible;‖ ―for criminal 
defense purposes, to a defendant, who shall have access to 
samples or analyses performed in connection with the case in 
which such defendant is charged;‖ and, ―if personally 
identifiable information is removed, for a population statistics 
database, for identification research and protocol 
development purposes, or for quality control purposes.‖  Id. § 
14132(b)(3). 
 
 Second, pursuant to the DNA Act, ―a[ny] person who 
knowingly discloses a sample or [DNA] result . . . in any 
manner to any person not authorized to receive it, or obtains 
or uses, without authorization, such sample or result‖ is 
punishable by a fine of up to $250,000 or imprisonment for a 
period of up to one year.  Id. § 14135e(c).  Moreover, each 
unlawful disclosure of the sample or result is punishable as a 
―separate offense.‖  Id.  Under the Crime Control Act, failure 
to comply with ―the quality control and privacy 
requirements‖ can result in cancellation of access to CODIS.  
Id. §14132(c).  In addition, the Crime Control Act requires 
the Director of the FBI to expunge the DNA record from 
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CODIS when a conviction is overturned or when, if the 
sample is taken following an arrest, the charge is dismissed or 
results in an acquittal or no charge is timely filed.  Id. § 
14132(d)(1)(A).  Expungement requires that the FBI receive a 
certified copy of a final court order establishing the final 
disposition of the arrest or conviction.  See id. 
 
 Additionally, two important Government policies that 
are not laid out in the statute provide protection against the 
improper use of the DNA profiles.  The first of these relates 
to the type and amount of information contained in CODIS.  
The FBI limits the information stored in CODIS—―[n]o 
names or other personal identifiers of the offenders, arrestees, 
or detainees are stored.‖  Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet,
11
 available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-
sheet  (last visited July 8, 2011).  Instead, the database 
contains only the following information:  (1) the DNA 
profile; (2) a number identifying the agency that submitted 
the DNA profile (―the Agency Identifier‖); (3) a ―Specimen 
Identification Number‖ which the FBI states is ―generally a 
number assigned sequentially at the time of sample 
collection‖ and ―does not correspond to the individual‘s 
social security number, criminal history identifier, or 
correctional facility identifier;‖ and (4) information 
identifying the laboratory personnel associated with creating 
the profile.  Id.  The FBI‘s restrictions on the type of 
                                                          
11
 ―NDIS‖ refers to the ―National DNA Index System‖ which 
―is considered one part of CODIS.‖  Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-
sheet (last visited July 8, 2011).   
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information stored in CODIS reflect Congress‘s concern 
about creating ―strict privacy protections.‖  H.R. Rep. No. 
106-900(I), at 27.  Therefore, a user conducting a search of 
CODIS can access only a limited amount of information, 
none of which identifies the person to whom the profile 
belongs. 
 
 The second relevant Government policy pertains to the 
data used to create the profile.  Neither the DNA Act nor the 
Crime Control Act specifies what portion of the DNA shall be 
used in creating the profile included in CODIS.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(2) (defining DNA analysis as ―analysis of 
the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) identification information 
in a bodily sample‖); Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13 n.10.  
Nevertheless, in practice, the FBI has developed a consistent 
policy of analyzing only what is commonly called ―junk 
DNA.‖  CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-
sheet (last visited July 8, 2011); accord Weikert, 504 F.3d at 
13 n.10 (―The government has stated repeatedly that it uses 
only junk DNA in creating individual DNA profiles. . . . For 
purposes of this appeal, we take the government at its word . . 
. .‖).  ―Junk DNA‖ refers to ―non-genic stretches of DNA not 
presently recognized as being responsible for trait coding.‖  
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(en banc) (plurality op.).  By using only so-called ―junk 
DNA‖ to create the profile, the Government ensures that 
meaningful personal genetic information about the individual 
is not published in CODIS. 
 
 Some explanation of the process by which the profile 
is created will illuminate this important feature of CODIS.  
The DNA profiles in CODIS make ―use of short tandem 
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repeat technology (―STR‖)‖ that are ―located at 13 markers 
(or loci) on DNA present in the specimen.‖  Kincade, 379 
F.3d at 818.  STRs have been described as repeated sequences 
of the ―base pairs‖ of DNA.  Henry T. Greely et al., Family 
Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch 
Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 248, 249 (2006).  They 
are found at ―thirteen specific regions, or loci, on an 
individual‘s DNA.‖  Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 65-66 
(1st Cir. 2010).  Again, these loci are ―non-genic stretches of 
DNA not presently recognized as being responsible for trait 
coding.‖  Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818. 
 
 STRs are useful for identification not because of any 
genetic information but because they ―result[] in different 
numbers of copies of repeated sequences.‖  Greely, supra, at 
249.  For example, ―[o]ne person might have two copies of 
the first marker that are four and eight repeats long, copies of 
the second that are eleven and twenty-three copies long, 
copies of the third that are three and ten copies long, and so 
on through all thirteen markers.‖  Id. at 250.  Therefore, it is 
―[t]he fact that these stretches of DNA have a different 
number of these repeats [that] makes them useful as 
‗markers.‘‖  Id.  These ―repeats‖ ―have no function.‖  Id. 
―They do not code for RNA, and they do not seem to be 
responsible for any difference in the structure or functioning 
of the people who carry them.‖  Id. 
 
 The legislative history of the DNA Act confirms that 
these ―genetic markers‖ were ―purposely selected because 
they are not associated with any known physical or medical 
characteristics, providing further assurance against the use of 
convicted offender DNA profiles for purposes other than law 
enforcement identification.‖  H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27.  
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Effectively, the use of ―junk DNA‖ creates a ―DNA 
fingerprint‖ that yields precise information about identity but 
little or no other personal information.
12  
As stated in the 
House Report: 
 
DNA profiles generated in conformity with the 
national standards do not reveal information 
relating to any medical condition or other trait.  
By design, the effect of the system is to provide 
a kind of genetic fingerprint, which uniquely 
identifies an individual, but does not provide a 
basis for determining or inferring anything else 
about the person. 
 
Id.  Due to the nature of DNA and the number of loci used to 
create the profile, ―the chance that two randomly selected 
individuals will share the same profile [is] infinitesimal—as 
are the chances that a person randomly selected from the 
population at large will present the same DNA profile as that 
drawn from crime-scene evidence.‖  Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819 
(plurality op.). 
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 In practice, ―[b]ecause there are observed group variances 
in the representation of various alleles at the STR loci . . . , 
DNA profiles derived by STR may yield probabilistic 
evidence of the contributor‘s race or sex.‖  Kincade, 379 F.3d 
at 818 (plurality op.).  Nevertheless, based on ―the substantial 
number of alleles present at each of the 13 STR loci (between 
7 and 20) and wide-spread variances in their representation 
among human beings,‖ DNA profiles created through STR 
are ―highly individuated.‖  Id. at 818–19 (internal citation 
omitted). 
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 In 2005 and 2006, Congress expanded the categories 
of individuals subject to DNA collection.  In its present form, 
the DNA Act allows the Attorney General to ―collect DNA 
samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or 
convicted.‖  42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A).  The latest 
expansion went into effect with the promulgation of 
regulations by the Attorney General effective January 9, 
2009.  See 28 C.F.R. § 28.12.  In relevant part, the regulations 
provide that ―[a]ny agency of the United States that arrests or 
detains individuals or supervises individuals facing charges 
shall collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, 
facing charges, or convicted.‖  Id. § 28.12(b).  The 
regulations also recognize the Attorney General‘s authority to 
limit the individuals from whom DNA is collected:  ―Unless 
otherwise directed by the Attorney General, the collection of 
DNA samples under this paragraph may be limited to 
individuals from whom the agency collects fingerprints and 
may be subject to other limitations or exceptions approved by 
the Attorney General.‖  Id. While the DNA Act permits the 
collection of DNA samples from individuals who are arrested 
or facing charges, the regulation mandates such collection. 
 
 The DNA Act and its state-law analogues have been 
subject to numerous constitutional challenges, generally on 
the ground that DNA collection and analysis is an 
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Every federal circuit court to have considered these statutes as 
applied to an individual who has been convicted and is either 
incarcerated or on probation, parole, or supervised release has 
upheld the constitutionality of the challenged statute.
13
  The 
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 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 36–37 (1st 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 950 (9th 
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Ninth Circuit, the only other Court of Appeals to have 
considered whether the statute is constitutional as applied to 
arrestees or pretrial detainees, initially upheld the expanded 
version of the DNA Act.  United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 
1213, 1219-24 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that under the 
totality of the circumstances test, collection of DNA samples 
under the DNA Fingerprint Act from a defendant who has 
been indicted, arrested, and detained for a federal felony but 
not yet convicted complies with the Fourth Amendment), 
though it has since withdrawn the panel opinions in 
anticipation of en banc review.
14
 
                                                                                                                                  
Cir. 2007); Weikert, 504 F.3d at 15; Banks v. United States, 
490 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679–81 (6th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924–25 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. 
Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. 
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 2005); Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 
at 177; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839.  Recently, in Boroian, 
supra, the First Circuit addressed the issue of whether the 
Government‘s retention of a former probationer‘s DNA 
profile in CODIS implicated the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Court of Appeals held that the ―FBI‘s retention and periodic 
matching of [the offender‘s DNA profile] against other 
profiles in CODIS for the purpose of identification‖ did not 
constitute an ―intrusion on the offender‘s legitimate 
expectation of privacy and thus [did] not constitute a separate 
Fourth Amendment search.‖  616 F.3d at 68. 
 
14
 On June 2, 2011, the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear Pool en 
banc.  The three-judge opinion may no longer ―be cited as 
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B.  Analytical Framework 
 
 In analyzing Mitchell‘s Fourth Amendment challenge 
to the 2006 DNA Act, the District Court performed a ―totality 
of the circumstances‖ test, balancing ―‗on the one hand, the 
degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual‘s 
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which [the search] is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.‘‖  Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).  Mitchell argued 
before the District Court that the proper approach was the 
―special needs‖ exception as set forth in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).  On appeal, Mitchell no longer 
challenges the District Court‘s adoption of the totality of the 
circumstances test, instead arguing that the search is 
unjustifiable under such an approach.  Although the District 
Court‘s form of analysis is uncontested, because we exercise 
plenary review, we determine de novo the appropriate 
analytical framework for assessing Mitchell‘s challenge. 
 
 Prior to Congress‘s 2005 and 2006 expansions of the 
DNA Act, every circuit court to have considered the 
constitutionality of a DNA indexing statute upheld the statute 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Nevertheless, the circuits have 
divided regarding the correct method of Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  We and the majority of circuits—the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of 
Columbia—have endorsed a totality of the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                  
binding precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.‖  
United States v. Pool, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 2151202, at *1 
(9th Cir. June 2, 2011). 
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approach.
15
  See Weikert, 504 F.3d at 9–11; Sczubelek, 402 
F.3d at 184; Jones, 962 F.2d at 306–08; Groceman, 354 F.3d 
at 413; Wilson, 517 F.3d at 427; Kraklio, 451 F.3d at 924; 
Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 946; Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 
1278 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 
494 n.1, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  In Sczubelek, a case 
concerning the constitutionality of the DNA Act as applied to 
individuals on supervised release, we examined both 
approaches and concluded that the proper mode of analysis 
was the totality of the circumstances test.  402 F.3d at 184.  
We rejected the special needs approach on the grounds that 
―the purpose for the collection of DNA goes well beyond the 
supervision by the Probation Office of an individual on 
supervised release.‖  Id.; accord Weikert, 504 F.3d at 10 
(holding that the special needs test is inappropriate as ―law 
enforcement objectives predominate‖ in the collection of 
DNA). 
 
 Sczubelek and the other cases adopting the totality of 
the circumstances approach rely on Knights and on Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), which concern, respectively, 
searches of a probationer and a parolee.  The totality of the 
circumstances approach, however, applies to circumstances 
beyond the supervised release setting.  The Supreme Court 
                                                          
15
 Only the Second and Seventh Circuits have consistently 
held otherwise, employing the special needs exception in 
every case concerning the constitutionality of a DNA 
indexing statute.  See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78; Hook, 471 
F.3d at 773; Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677–78 (7th Cir. 
2004).  The Tenth Circuit has noted that its ―own precedents 
are divided,‖ but it applied the totality of the circumstances 
test in its most recent case.  Banks, 490 F.3d at 1183–84. 
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has ―described ‗the balancing of competing interests‘ as ‗the 
key principle of the Fourth Amendment.‘‖  Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 
452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)) (further citation omitted); see 
also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559–60 (1979) (upholding 
the constitutionality of strip searches of pretrial detainees 
under a totality of the circumstances balancing approach).  
Balancing the totality of the circumstances is the ―general 
Fourth Amendment approach‖ used to assess the 
reasonableness of a contested search.  Knights, 534 U.S. at 
118.  As such, we follow Sczubelek and apply the totality of 
the circumstances test to the present challenge to the latest 
iteration of the DNA Act. 
 
1.  Case Law Analyzing DNA Collection Following 
Conviction 
 
 As a starting point, it is useful to examine how the 
cases upholding DNA collection following conviction 
assessed the totality of the circumstances in concluding that 
such searches were reasonable.  These cases analyzed 
challenges to the DNA Act and its state-law analogues 
brought by individuals who were incarcerated following 
convictions (―prisoners‖) or by individuals on probation, 
parole, or supervised release (collectively, ―probationers‖).16 
 
 In our case in this category, Sczubelek, we 
―examine[d] . . . the taking of the [DNA] sample under the . . 
. Knights totality of the circumstances test‖ and concluded 
                                                          
16
 Although the analysis may differ slightly with respect to 
individuals on parole, probation, or supervised release, for 
present purposes, these differences are immaterial. 
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that ―the taking of a DNA sample from an individual on 
supervised release is not an unreasonable search.‖  402 F.3d 
at 184.  In conducting the Fourth Amendment balancing, we 
considered a number of factors.  ―First, the intrusion of a 
blood test is minimal.‖  Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)).  Second, while 
acknowledging that the ―slight intrusion [of a blood test] into 
an ordinary citizen‘s privacy [would be] unconstitutional, 
individuals on supervised release, like individuals on 
probation, ‗do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every 
citizen is entitled.‘‖  Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184 (quoting 
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (internal quotation marks & citations 
omitted)).  Considering Sczubelek‘s status as an individual 
who had been convicted of a felony and who was on 
supervised release, we held that he ―ha[d] a reduced right to 
privacy—and in particular to privacy of identity. . . . 
Individuals on supervised release cannot reasonably expect to 
keep information bearing on their physical identity from 
government records.‖  Id. at 184–85.  Thus, in assessing ―the 
degree to which [the DNA collection] intrude[d] on 
[Sczubelek‘s] privacy,‖ id. at 182 (internal quotation marks & 
citation omitted), we concluded that ―for criminal offenders 
the privacy interests implicated by the collection of DNA are 
minimal,‖ id. at 185. 
 
 On the other side of the scale, ―the degree to which 
[DNA collection] is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests,‖ id. at 182 (internal quotation marks 
& citation omitted), ―we agree[d] with the government that it 
has a compelling interest in the collection of identifying 
information of criminal offenders,‖ id. at 185.  We reasoned 
that ―[a] DNA database promotes increased accuracy in the 
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases‖ and will ―aid 
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in solving crimes when they occur in the future,‖ ―help to 
exculpate individuals who are serving sentences of 
imprisonment for crimes they did not commit,‖ and ―help to 
eliminate individuals from suspect lists when crimes occur.‖  
Id.  As such, we concluded that ―[t]he interest in accurate 
criminal investigations and prosecutions is a compelling 
interest that the DNA Act can reasonably be said to advance.‖  
Id. 
 
 Finally, we considered additional factors that 
contributed to the reasonableness of the search.  Analyzing 
the prior version of the DNA Act, we held that the Act itself 
clearly delineates from whom a sample must be taken, 
leaving no discretion to probation officers.  Id. at 187.  
Moreover, we reasoned, the DNA Act specifies permissible 
uses for the samples and punishes unauthorized disclosure of 
DNA samples.  Id.  It also provides for expungement of the 
DNA profile from CODIS upon reversal or dismissal of a 
conviction.  Id.  Assessing the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the collection and analysis of DNA samples from 
probationers, we concluded: 
 
In view of the importance of the public interests 
in the collection of DNA samples from criminal 
offenders for entry into a national DNA 
database and the degree to which the DNA Act 
serves to meet those interests, balanced against 
the minimal intrusion occasioned by giving a 
blood sample and the reduced privacy 
expectations of individuals on supervised 
release, we conclude that the collection of DNA 
samples from individuals on supervised release, 
pursuant to the DNA Act, is not an 
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unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
Id.  
 
 Our sister circuits have engaged in a very similar 
analysis, relying in general on the same considerations that 
informed our decision in Sczubelek.  The other circuits have 
identified some factors that we did not explicitly consider, 
such as the government‘s compelling interest in 
―contribut[ing] to the solution of past crimes.‖  Kriesel, 508 
F.3d at 949.  Ultimately, those courts likewise concluded that 
the collection of DNA samples from prisoners or probationers 
is a reasonable search consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 
 
2.  Totality of the Circumstances Analysis 
 
 The 2006 revision to the DNA Act expanded its scope 
to encompass both arrestees and pretrial detainees.  Violence 
Against Women & Department of Justice Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2960, 3085 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A)).  
Mitchell was placed in pretrial detention following his arrest 
and was detained at the time that the Government sought to 
collect a sample of his DNA pursuant to the DNA Act and its 
implementing regulation.  Thus the challenge currently before 
us implicates the collection of DNA from an individual who 
is both an arrestee and a pretrial detainee. 
 
 As a threshold matter, we must tackle the question of 
whether Mitchell‘s attack on 42 U.S.C. § 14135a is in the 
form of an as-applied or a facial challenge.  Following oral 
argument, this Court requested additional briefing to clarify 
  38 
this issue, which ultimately affects the burden on Mitchell.  A 
party asserting a facial challenge ―must establish that no set 
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.‖  
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  That is, 
Mitchell would have to show that the ―[statute] is 
unconstitutional in all of its applications.‖  Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 
(2008) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).  This is the ―most 
difficult challenge to mount successfully.‖  Salerno, 481 U.S. 
at 745.  On the other hand, ―[a]n as-applied attack . . . does 
not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that 
its application to a particular person under particular 
circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.‖  
United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 
 If the additional briefing makes one thing clear, it is 
that the parties dispute whether Mitchell‘s challenge was 
facial or as-applied.
17
  In addition, the District Court did not 
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 At oral argument, in response to a question regarding 
whether Mitchell raised an as-applied or a facial challenge, 
the FPD responded that Mitchell advanced a facial attack on 
the statute.  Notwithstanding the FPD‘s statement during oral 
argument, in the additional briefing submitted to the Court, 
the FPD maintained that Mitchell‘s challenge to the statute is, 
and had always been, as-applied.  The FPD contended that 
Mitchell‘s legal arguments focused on the particular 
circumstances of his situation, thus narrowing the nature of 
his challenge to the statute.  The FPD also argued that the 
Government‘s position on appeal revealed that the 
Government believed that Mitchell had advanced an as-
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specify what type of challenge it was considering, and the 
original briefs filed with this court are similarly ambiguous.  
Given that there is no consensus among the parties about the 
type of legal challenge being asserted, we will address both.  
In doing so, we adopt an approach similar to the one we took 
recently in Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273, where after finding 
that there was some ambiguity about whether the defendant 
advanced an as-applied or a facial challenge, we addressed 
both.  While we note that facial challenges are disfavored, 
Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, the circumstances 
in this situation weigh in favor of addressing both challenges. 
 
 We will begin with Mitchell‘s as-applied challenge.  
See Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 
327-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that ―[t]he ‗usual judicial 
practice‘ is to address an as-applied challenge before a facial 
challenge‖) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. 
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1989)).  In order to mount a 
successful as-applied challenge, Mitchell must show that 
―under [these] particular circumstances [he was] deprived . . . 
of a constitutional right.‖  Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273. 
                                                                                                                                  
applied challenge.  Mitchell‘s appointed counsel, Knorr, 
joined the FPD‘s submission.   
 
 Not surprisingly, the Government‘s position was that 
Mitchell‘s challenge to the statute is, and always has been, a 
facial challenge.  The Government submitted that Mitchell 
presented a facial challenge in the District Court, which the 
court treated as such, and that, on appeal, the Government 
framed the issues as relating to the facial constitutionality of 
the statue. 
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a.  Expectation of Privacy 
 
 When we analyze the reasonableness of a search by 
examining the totality of the circumstances, we begin ―‗by 
assessing . . . the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon 
an individual‘s privacy.‘‖  Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19 
(quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300). 
 
 The collection of DNA under § 14135a entails two 
separate ―searches.‖  The first is the physical collection of the 
DNA sample.  Neither party disputes that the collection of a 
DNA sample constitutes an invasion of privacy that is subject 
to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, and we have so 
held.  See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 182 (concluding that giving 
a required blood sample for DNA analysis is a search); 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (holding that ―[w]e have long 
recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood 
to be analyzed for alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth 
Amendment search. . . . This physical intrusion, penetrating 
beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.‖ (internal 
quotation marks, citations, & some alterations omitted)). 
 
 Mitchell contends that the act of collecting a DNA 
sample ―constitute[s] [a] significant invasion[] of an 
individual‘s bodily integrity and privacy.‖  (Mitchell Br. 41.)  
This argument, however, is foreclosed by binding precedent.  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ―intrusion 
occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since such ‗tests 
are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical 
examinations and experience with them teaches that the 
quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most 
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people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or 
pain.‘‖  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (quoting Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)); accord Sczubelek, 402 
F.3d at 184 (―[T]he intrusion of a blood test is minimal.‖).  
Moreover, ―Schmerber recognized society‘s judgment that 
blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition 
on an individual‘s personal privacy and bodily integrity.‖  
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985).  Thus, Mitchell‘s 
characterization to the contrary must fail. 
 
 Furthermore, the test sanctioned in Schmerber was 
venipuncture, in which blood was drawn from the arm.  384 
U.S. at 759-60.  ―[C]urrently the FBI provides kits that allow 
a blood sample to be collected by means of a finger prick,‖ a 
far less invasive procedure.  DNA-Sample Collection & 
Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction 
(―DNA-Sample Collection‖), 73 Fed. Reg. 74932, 74935 
(Dec. 10, 2008).  DNA samples may also be collected by 
swabbing the inside of the mouth (a ―buccal swab‖).  Id.  This 
method is likewise less invasive than venipuncture.  Nicholas 
v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that 
cheek swabs, although constituting a search, are less invasive 
than blood draws); cf. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (noting that 
breath tests are less intrusive than blood tests as they ―do not 
require piercing the skin and may be conducted safely outside 
a hospital environment‖). 
 
 In light of this precedent, the act of collecting a DNA 
sample is ―neither a significant nor an unusual intrusion.‖  
Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12.  Therefore, in balancing the interests 
required in our Fourth Amendment analysis, the intrusion 
occasioned by the act of collecting the DNA sample is 
minimal and does not weigh significantly in Mitchell‘s favor.  
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 The second ―search‖ at issue is, of course, the 
processing of the DNA sample and creation of the DNA 
profile for CODIS.  This search also has the potential to 
infringe upon privacy interests.  See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 
182; Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85.  Mitchell argues that this 
intrusion is significant and unreasonable given that ―the scope 
of information that can be obtained from a DNA sample is 
extraordinarily broad.‖  (Mitchell Br. 34.)  Furthermore, 
Mitchell speculates that the Government might disregard its 
policy of using only ―junk DNA‖ and surmises that, with 
technological advances, ―junk DNA‖ could reveal far more 
extensive information than it presently discloses.  These 
concerns weighed heavily in the District Court‘s analysis and 
caused the District Court to conclude that DNA is ―an 
information science,‖ ―not an identification science.‖  
Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 609. 
 
 We are ―mindful of the vast amount of sensitive 
information that can be mined from a person‘s DNA and the 
very strong privacy interests that all individuals have in this 
information.‖  Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85.  Nevertheless, every 
one of our sister circuits to have considered the concerns 
raised by Mitchell has rejected them given their speculative 
nature and the safeguards attendant to DNA collection and 
analysis.  See, e.g., Boroian, 616 F.3d at 66-69; Kriesel, 508 
F.3d at 948 & n.10.  As the First Circuit held, the ―DNA Act 
offers a substantial deterrent to such hypothetical abuse by 
imposing a criminal penalty for misuse of DNA samples. . . . 
[O]n the record before us, the possibility that junk DNA may 
not be junk DNA some day also does not significantly 
augment [the defendant‘s] privacy interest in the present 
case.‖  Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.  Mitchell‘s concerns are not 
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reflected in the record before us.  The mere possibility of such 
misuse ―can be accorded only limited weight in a balancing 
analysis that focuses on present circumstances.‖  Weikert, 504 
F.3d at 13; accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1191. 
 
 Mitchell also highlights the potential misuse of the 
information contained in the DNA profile.  While Mitchell 
has not provided any evidence of misuse of a DNA sample or 
profile, we are also reassured by the numerous protections in 
place guarding against that possibility.  As we explained 
earlier, the Act criminalizes the misuse of both the sample 
and the analysis generated from the sample.  42 U.S.C. § 
14135e(c).  These criminal penalties offer a ―substantial 
deterrent to such hypothetical abuse‖ of the kind advanced by 
Mitchell.  Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.  Additional protections 
exist.  The Act provides that failure to comply with ―the 
quality control and privacy requirements‖ can result in 
cancellation of access to CODIS.  42 U.S.C. § 14132(c).  
Access to the ―computer terminals/servers containing the 
CODIS software,‖ which are ―located in physically secure 
space at a criminal justice agency,‖ is restricted to ―those 
individuals authorized to use CODIS and approved by the 
FBI.‖  CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-
sheet (last visited July 8, 2011). 
 
 Moreover, the DNA profile may only be used for four 
limited purposes.  42 § 14132(b)(3).
18
  Use of the profile for 
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 The parameters of the statute are, of course, essential in 
limiting the Government‘s ability to use the information it 
collects.  Though we need not decide the point today, any 
attempt by the Government to go beyond these enumerated 
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any other reason would violate the statute and be subject to 
the aforementioned criminal penalties.  Congress‘s limited 
purpose in enacting § 14135a is evident in the history of the 
Act.  See, e.g., DNA-Sample Collection, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
74933 (―These DNA profiles, which embody information 
concerning 13 ‗core loci,‘ amount to ‗genetic fingerprints‘ 
that can be used to identify an individual uniquely, but do not 
disclose an individual‘s traits, disorders, or dispositions.‖).  
These limits on the lawful use of the DNA profile are further 
insured by the method for creating a CODIS profile; that is, 
the policy of using only ―junk DNA‖ in creating the DNA 
profile, which does not contain any individual genetic 
information.  The Government further protects the identity of 
the sample donor by ensuring that no other potentially 
identifying information is contained in the CODIS database. 
 
 The second scenario—in which scientific advances 
make it possible to extract more information from ―junk 
DNA‖—is ―not unforeseeable.‖  Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.  
Nevertheless, our sister circuits have declined to factor this 
future risk into their assessment of the constitutionality of the 
DNA collection program as it exists at present.  See Amerson, 
483 F.3d at 85 n.13 (―Should the uses to which ‗junk DNA‘ 
can be put be shown in the future to be significantly greater 
than the record before us today suggests, a reconsideration of 
the reasonableness balance struck would be necessary.‖); 
Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 948 n.10; Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.  The 
First Circuit recently rejected this same argument:  
 
                                                                                                                                  
purposes would seem likely to first require congressional 
action. 
  45 
―[S]cientific advances might make it possible to 
deduce information beyond identity from the 
junk DNA‖ that forms the thirteen-loci profiles 
stored in CODIS.  Future government uses of 
the DNA profiles in CODIS could potentially 
reveal more intimate or private information 
about the profile‘s owner and depart from the 
uses for which the profiles were originally 
lawfully created and retained. In this case, 
however, these are merely hypothetical 
possibilities. . . . As in Weikert, ―the possibility 
that junk DNA may not be junk DNA some day 
. . . does not significantly augment [Boroian‘s] 
privacy interest in the present case.‖ 
 
Boroian, 616 F.3d at 69 (internal citations omitted).  
 
 We agree with this analysis.  While we acknowledge 
the seriousness of Mitchell‘s concerns about the possible 
misuse and future use of DNA samples, we conclude that 
these hypothetical possibilities are unsupported by the record 
before us and thus do not have any substantial weight in our 
totality of the circumstances analysis.  Should technological 
advancements change the value of ―junk DNA,‖ 
reconsideration of our Fourth Amendment analysis may be 
appropriate.  Cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 
2629 (2010) (―The judiciary risks error by elaborating too 
fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging 
technology before its role in society has become clear.‖).  At 
this juncture, however, we consider the amount and type of 
personal information to be contained in the DNA profile to be 
nominal.  See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 838 (―As currently 
structured and implemented . . . the DNA Act‘s compulsory 
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profiling of qualified federal offenders can only be described 
as minimally invasive-both in terms of the bodily intrusion it 
occasions, and the information it lawfully produces.‖). 
 
 Next, contending that a DNA profile is used for far 
more than identity, Mitchell attempts to distinguish a DNA 
profile from conventional fingerprints.
19
  The District Court 
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 One way in which Mitchell attempts to distinguish DNA 
from fingerprints is to argue that ―[u]nlike fingerprints, DNA 
can be used to investigate biological relationships between 
individuals.‖  (Mitchell Br. 35)  There are two potential uses 
of the database that implicate biological relationships.  The 
first, is an ―ordinary search[] seeking exact matches‖ that 
incidentally leads to a partial match, which may or may not 
belong to the relative of the person whose profile was run 
against the database.  DNA-Sample Collection, 73 Fed. Reg. 
at 74938.  The second is a ―familial search‖ which typically 
refers to a  purposeful search of the DNA database ―not for 
the person who left the crime-scene sample, but rather for a 
relative of that individual.‖  Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: 
Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 291, 
297, 300 (2010).   
 
 The possibility of an unintentional or intentional 
CODIS ―hit‖ for Mitchell‘s biological relatives does not 
change our analysis.  To begin with, Mitchell has not shown 
that he has standing to assert the Fourth Amendment rights of 
his relatives.  See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–40 
(1978).  Even if he did, the record does not contain any 
evidence of a possible search or investigation of Mitchell‘s 
relatives, and the claim is entirely speculative.  See Boroian, 
616 F.3d at 70 (―The record contains no other information 
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agreed, holding that ―to compare the fingerprinting process 
and the resulting identification information obtained 
therefrom with DNA profiling is pure folly.‖  Mitchell, 681 F. 
Supp. 2d at 608.  Yet many of our sister circuits have 
expressly adopted just this analogy: 
 
To be sure, genetic fingerprints differ somewhat 
from their metacarpal brethren, and future 
technological advances in DNA testing 
(coupled with possible expansions of the DNA 
Act‘s scope) may empower the government to 
conduct wide-ranging ―DNA dragnets‖ that 
raise justifiable citations to George Orwell.  
Today, however, . . . CODIS operates much like 
an old-fashioned fingerprint database (albeit 
more efficiently). 
 
                                                                                                                                  
shedding light on how frequently partial matches occur in the 
national database, exactly what they reveal, or what kind of 
follow-up investigation is done when a partial match arises. . . 
. [Therefore] . . . that claim is similarly speculative.‖).  In this 
respect, we also find it significant that CODIS is not designed 
for intentional familial searches and experts agree that 
searches of that type would not produce any useful 
information.  DNA-Sample Collection, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74938 
(―The current design of the DNA identification system does 
not encompass searches of this type against the national DNA 
index.‖); see also Murphy, supra at 300 (―[M]ost experts 
acknowledge that the current iteration of the CODIS software 
does a poor job of identifying true leads in familial 
searches.‖). 
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Johnson, 440 F.3d at 499 (internal citations omitted); 
Boroian, 616 F.3d at 65 (―Under the DNA Act, DNA profiles 
currently function as identification records not unlike 
fingerprints, photographs, or social security numbers.‖); 
accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1192 (―These restrictions allow the 
Government to use an offender‘s DNA profile in substantially 
the same way that the Government uses fingerprint and 
photographic evidence . . . . Only here, DNA provides a more 
advanced and accurate means . . . .‖); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 
1556, 1559 (9th Cir. 1995) (―The information derived from 
the blood sample is substantially the same as that derived 
from fingerprinting—an identifying marker unique to the 
individual from whom the information is derived.‖), 
overruled on other grounds, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 
U.S. 67 (2001); Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 (―The governmental 
justification for this form of identification . . . relies on no 
argument different in kind from that traditionally advanced 
for taking fingerprints and photographs, but with additional 
force because of the potentially greater precision of DNA 
sampling and matching methods.‖). 
 
 Like fingerprints, ―at least in the current state of 
scientific knowledge, the DNA profile derived from the 
[individual‘s] blood sample establishes only a record of the 
[individual‘s] identity.‖  Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85; accord 
Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 947.  Given the protections built into the 
DNA Act, the Government‘s stated practice of only analyzing 
―junk DNA,‖ and the current limits of technology, the 
information stored in CODIS serves only an identification 
purpose.  Moreover, the regulations of the 2006 amendment 
to the DNA Act confirms the intention to use DNA profiles as 
―sanitized ‗genetic fingerprints‘ that can be used to identify 
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an individual uniquely, but do not disclose an individual‘s 
traits, disorders, or dispositions.‖  DNA-Sample Collection, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 74937.  Given the record in front of us today, 
we conclude that a DNA profile is used solely as an accurate, 
unique, identifying marker—in other words, as fingerprints 
for the twenty-first century. 
 
 Considering a DNA profile as a tool for establishing 
identity, the issue becomes the degree to which an individual 
has an expectation of privacy in his or her own identity.  In 
Sczubelek, we considered this issue with respect to 
individuals on supervised release and noted that they ―‗do not 
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.‘‖  
402 F.3d at 184 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119).  In light 
of this restricted liberty right, we held that ―Sczubelek, as an 
individual on supervised release, has a reduced right to 
privacy—and in particular to privacy of identity.‖  Id.  Our 
analysis relied heavily on Sczubelek‘s status as a convicted 
felon on supervised release; as such, it cannot be adopted 
wholesale in the present case, as Mitchell correctly argues.  
Instead, the critical question is whether arrestees and pretrial 
detainees who have not been convicted of felonies have a 
diminished privacy interest in their identity. 
 
 A useful analogue is case law assessing the validity of 
fingerprinting arrestees and pretrial detainees as part of a 
routine booking process.
20
  In an early case, the Second 
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 Many cases simply assume the propriety of such booking 
procedures with little analysis.  See, e.g., Napolitano v. 
United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965) (―Taking of 
fingerprints [before releasing an arrestee on bail] is 
universally standard procedure, and no violation of 
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Circuit held that fingerprinting is a ―means for the 
identification of prisoners so that they may be apprehended in 
the event of escape, so that second offenders may be detected 
for purposes of proper sentence where conviction is had, and 
so that the government may be able to ascertain . . . whether 
the defendant has been previously convicted.‖  United States 
v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932).  Acknowledging that 
―[a]ny restraint of the person may be burdensome,‖ the court 
held that ―[t]he slight interference with the person involved in 
finger printing seems to us one which must be borne in the 
common interest.‖  Id.  The court emphasized that 
fingerprinting arrestees is for the purpose of identification: 
 
Finger printing seems to be no more than an 
extension of methods of identification long used 
in dealing with persons under arrest for real or 
supposed violations of the criminal laws.  It is 
known to be a very certain means devised by 
modern science to reach the desired end, and 
has become especially important in a time when 
increased population and vast aggregations of 
people in urban centers have rendered the 
notoriety of the individual in the community no 
longer a ready means of identification. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
constitutional rights.‖); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 
882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (―[I]t is elementary that a person in 
lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing 
and fingerprinting as part of routine identification 
processes.‖); United States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788, 792–93 
(7th Cir. 1955). 
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Id.; accord United States v. Krapf, 285 F.2d 647, 650–51 (3d 
Cir. 1961) (―[Fingerprinting] is a means of identification 
which is useful in many circumstances some of which relate 
to the enforcement of our laws.‖).  The court upheld the 
booking procedure based on ―the general right of the 
authorities charged with the enforcement of the criminal law 
to employ finger printing as an appropriate means to identify 
criminals and detect crime.‖21  Kelly, 55 F.2d at 70. 
 
 Suspicionless fingerprinting of all citizens would 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  See Hayes v. Florida, 470 
U.S. 811, 813–18 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 
727 (1969).  Nevertheless, it is ―elementary‖ that blanket 
fingerprinting of individuals who have been lawfully arrested 
or charged with a crime does not run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Smith, 324 F.2d at 882.  The universal 
approbation of fingerprinting as a method of identifying 
arrestees despite the invasion of privacy ―is not surprising 
                                                          
21
 Similar to the maintenance of DNA profiles in CODIS, 
fingerprints are stored in a database.  When fingerprints are 
taken from an arrestee, they are run against a database to 
search for matches to other unsolved crimes.  This, indeed, is 
part of the purpose of fingerprinting an arrestee.  See Kelly, 
55 F.2d at 68 (noting that fingerprints allow for the detection 
of ―second offenders‖).  Accessing such fingerprint or DNA 
databases does not independently implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Johnson, 440 F.3d at 499 (―We note that the 
consequences of the contrary conclusion would be staggering:  
Police departments across the country could face an 
intolerable burden if every ‗search‘ of an ordinary fingerprint 
database were subject to Fourth Amendment challenges.  The 
same applies to DNA fingerprints.‖). 
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when we consider that probable cause had already supplied 
the basis for bringing the person within the criminal justice 
system.  With the person‘s loss of liberty upon arrest comes 
the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy 
otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.‖  Jones, 962 
F.2d at 306; see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 864 (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (―Arrestees‘ privacy interests . . . appear to be 
significantly reduced.‖).  This analysis rests on two 
foundational principles—the presence of probable cause to 
arrest and the use of fingerprints as a method of 
identification: 
 
[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable 
cause, his identification becomes a matter of 
legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim 
privacy in it.  We accept this proposition 
because the identification of suspects is relevant 
not only to solving the crime for which the 
suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a 
permanent record to solve other past and future 
crimes. 
 
Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.  Moreover, we permit such 
fingerprinting ―whether or not the proof of a particular 
suspect‘s crime will involve the use of fingerprint 
identification.‖  Id.; accord Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559–60. 
 
 This logic extends to the collection and analysis of 
DNA samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees.  See 
Anderson v. Virginia, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007) (―A 
DNA sample of the accused taken upon arrest, while more 
revealing, is no different in character than acquiring 
fingerprints upon arrest.‖).  DNA collection occurs only after 
  53 
it has been determined that there is probable cause to believe 
that the arrestee committed a crime.
 
 In light of this probable 
cause finding, arrestees possess a diminished expectation of 
privacy in their own identity, which has traditionally justified 
taking their fingerprints and photographs.
22 
 Likewise, 
because DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act 
function as ―genetic fingerprints‖ used only for identification 
purposes, arrestees and pretrial detainees have reduced 
privacy interests in the information derived from a DNA 
sample. 
 
 Mitchell raises an additional concern with the DNA 
Act and its implementing regulations:  the potential indefinite 
retention of the sample itself.  Nothing in the statute instructs 
the Government what to do with the DNA sample when an 
individual is no longer under correctional supervision.  
However, federal law does mandate the expungement of the 
DNA profile when the FBI receives a certified copy of a court 
order  showing that a conviction is overturned or when, if the 
sample is taken following an arrest, no charge is filed, the 
charge is dismissed, or results in an acquittal.  42 U.S.C. § 
14132(d)(1)(A).  Ultimately, to the extent that Mitchell 
submits that the potential future indefinite retention of his 
sample implicates privacy concerns, that issue is not before us 
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 In this case, we need not reach the question of whether any 
additional probable cause requirement other than the 
requirements inherent in the statute—that an individual is 
arrested—is necessary.  We note, however, that Mitchell was 
indicted before his arrest, so that the finding of probable 
cause in this case was made by a grand jury and was not left 
to the discretion of a policy officer alone. 
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now.  Mitchell remains arrested, indicted, and detained.  His 
DNA sample has not yet been collected and he therefore has 
not sought expungement.  Therefore, he is not in a position to 
challenge the retention of his sample.  Cf. Weikert, 504 F.3d 
at 3 (―Because the appellant is currently on supervised release 
and will remain so . . .we do not resolve the question of 
whether it is also constitutional to retain the DNA profile in 
[CODIS].‖).  We leave for another day the question of 
whether an individual may challenge the Government‘s 
retention of his DNA sample or profile. 
 
 In light of the restrictions built into the DNA profiling 
process, Mitchell‘s arguments that it constitutes a significant 
invasion of privacy are unavailing.  Relying on the District 
Court‘s opinion, Mitchell argues that collection of DNA from 
arrestees and pretrial detainees cannot be justified on the basis 
of probable cause as they have not yet been convicted of any 
offense and thus have the benefit of the presumption of 
innocence.  See Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 607.  The District 
Court properly declined ―to elevate a finding of probable 
cause to the level of a proper determination of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‖  Id. at 606.  Nonetheless, it acknowledged 
that an arrestee or pretrial detainee, who is brought into the 
criminal justice system on the basis of probable cause, ―has a 
diminished expectation of privacy in his identity.‖  Id. at 608.  
The District Court nevertheless concluded that the 
presumption of innocence outweighed this diminished 
expectation of privacy because of the ―complex, 
comprehensive, inherently private information contained in a 
DNA sample.‖  Id.  As we discussed above, however, this 
conclusion is based on a flawed premise—that because ―DNA 
samples may reveal private information regarding familial 
lineage and predisposition to over four thousand types of 
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genetic conditions and diseases [as well as] genetic markers 
for traits,‖ the DNA profiles entered into CODIS also contain 
this information.  Id. (emphasis added).  DNA profiles, as 
opposed to DNA samples, reveal only identity, in which 
arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy.
23
 
 
 In sum, at present DNA profiling is simply a more 
precise method of ascertaining identity and is thus akin to 
fingerprinting, which has long been accepted as part of 
routine booking procedures.  The traditional fingerprinting 
cases emphasize that arrestees and pretrial detainees have a 
diminished expectation of privacy in their identity.  None of 
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 Both Mitchell and the District Court rely heavily on 
Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 2009), in 
which the Ninth Circuit held that DNA collection from 
pretrial detainees was unconstitutional because it was not 
related to prison security.  The court reasoned that while 
penal facilities may conduct administrative searches, 
―[n]either the Supreme Court nor our court has permitted 
general suspicionless, warrantless searches of pre-trial 
detainees for grounds other than institutional security or other 
legitimate penological interests.‖  Id.  This reasoning does not 
undermine the line of case law holding that booking 
procedures that confirm an individual‘s identity are both 
reasonable and necessary to further legitimate law 
enforcement objectives.  The Ninth Circuit itself has noted 
that ―everyday ‗booking‘ procedures routinely require even 
the merely accused to provide fingerprint identification, 
regardless of whether investigation of the crime involves 
fingerprint evidence.‖  Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560.  As Friedman 
did not consider the identification purpose of DNA samples, 
we are not inclined to follow it. 
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Mitchell‘s arguments compels us to conclude that the same 
diminished expectation of privacy should not apply to DNA 
profiling. 
 
b.  Government Interests 
 
 The second step in the totality of the circumstances 
analysis is to assess ―the degree to which [the search] is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.‖  Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (internal quotation marks 
& citation omitted).  The Government‘s interests in this case 
are not as great as those identified in Sczubelek, as the 
interests in supervising convicted individuals on release and 
deterring recidivism do not apply to arrestees or pretrial 
detainees.  402 F.3d at 186.  Nevertheless, the other key 
interest recognized in Sczubelek—collecting identifying 
information to aid law enforcement—applies with equal force 
to arrestees and pretrial detainees.  Id. at 185 (―The interest in 
accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions is a 
compelling interest that the DNA Act can reasonably be said 
to advance.‖). 
 
 Mitchell acknowledges that DNA profiling serves 
important law enforcement interests, but he argues that these 
interests can be equally well served by collecting DNA 
samples post-conviction.  It is true, as Mitchell asserts, that 
the information contained in a DNA sample does not change 
over time and cannot be concealed; thus, there is no need for 
the Government to act quickly to prevent the destruction of 
evidence.  Nevertheless, the Government argues that there are 
other legitimate interests that weigh in favor of pretrial DNA 
collection.  We agree. 
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 Most compelling is the Government‘s strong interest in 
identifying arrestees.  ―[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon 
probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of 
legitimate state interest.‖  Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.  Given ―the 
potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching 
methods,‖ DNA profiling serves this interest better than 
fingerprinting.  Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 186 (quoting Jones, 
962 F.2d at 307); accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1190 (―While 
fingerprint evidence might often be sufficient, we have 
always recognized the Government‘s compelling need to 
accurately identify offenders.‖).  Moreover, DNA may permit 
identification in cases without fingerprint or eyewitness 
evidence.  As we explained in Sczubelek: 
 
It is a well recognized aspect of criminal 
conduct that the perpetrator will take unusual 
steps to conceal not only his conduct, but also 
his identity.  Disguises used while committing a 
crime may be supplemented or replaced by 
changed names, and even changed physical 
features.  Traditional methods of identification 
by photographs, historical records, and 
fingerprints often prove inadequate.  The DNA, 
however, is claimed to be unique to each 
individual and cannot, within current scientific 
knowledge, be altered.  The individuality of the 
DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law 
enforcement effort to match suspects and 
criminal conduct.  Even a suspect with altered 
physical features cannot escape the match that 
his DNA might make with a sample contained 
in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a crime 
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within samples of blood, skin, semen or hair 
follicles. 
 
402 F.3d at 185 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted); 
accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1190.  Thus, DNA collection 
furthers the Government‘s interest in accurately identifying 
arrestees and pretrial detainees, an interest that would be lost 
if the Government waited until conviction to take a DNA 
sample.
24
 
 
 The Government‘s ability to accurately identify a 
person through their DNA profile cannot be entirely 
substituted by other means of identification, such as 
fingerprints or photographs.  DNA analysis enables the 
Government to identify a person who has changed their 
appearance, either permanently or temporarily.  Weikert, 504 
F.3d at 14 (―Even a suspect with altered physical features 
cannot escape the match that his DNA might make with a 
sample contained in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a 
crime.‖) (citing Amerson, 483 F.3d at 87); accord Sczubelek, 
402 F.3d at 185. Similarly, an arrestee who has altered his or 
her fingerprints in order to avoid detection could also be 
identified with certainty through their DNA.  Therefore, the 
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 The federal government is not alone in concluding that the 
interests served by pretrial DNA collection and testing would 
not be adequately served by post-conviction collection.  As of 
August 10, 2010, twenty-four states have enacted statutes 
permitting the collection of a DNA sample from some or all 
arrestees.  State Laws for Arrestee DNA Databases, 
DNAResource.com (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.dnaresource.com/ 
documents/ArresteeDNALaws-2010.pdf. 
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use of CODIS in the law enforcement process assures greater 
precision in the identification of arrestees.  
 
 Moreover, there are two components to a person‘s 
identity:  ―who that person is (the person‘s name, date of 
birth, etc.) and what that person has done (whether the 
individual has a criminal record, whether he is the same 
person who committed an as-yet unsolved crime across town, 
etc.).‖  Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009).  The second component—what a person has 
done—has important pretrial ramifications.  Running an 
arrestee‘s DNA profile through CODIS could reveal matches 
to crime-scene DNA samples from unsolved cases.  Whether 
an arrestee is possibly implicated in other crimes is critical to 
the determination of whether or not to order detention 
pending trial.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (stating that 
factors to be considered in the bail determination include a 
person‘s ―past conduct‖ and ―criminal history‖). 
 
 To the extent that DNA profiling assists the 
Government in accurate criminal investigations and 
prosecutions (both of which are dependent on accurately 
identifying the suspect), it is in the Government‘s interest to 
have this information as soon as possible.  Collecting DNA 
samples from arrestees can speed both the investigation of the 
crime of arrest and the solution of any past crime for which 
there is a match in CODIS.  Moreover, ―use of CODIS 
promptly clears thousands of potential suspects—thereby 
preventing them from ever being put in that position, and 
advancing the overwhelming public interest in prosecuting 
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crimes accurately.‖25  Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839 n.38 
(plurality op.) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).  
The assistance provided by CODIS is not hypothetical:  as of 
May 2011, CODIS ―ha[d] produced over 144,400 hits 
assisting in more than 138,100 investigations.‖  FBI, CODIS-
NDIS Statistics, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited July 8, 2011).  While 
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 The Government also argues that the collection of DNA 
samples from arrestees helps to detect and deter any 
violations of pretrial release.  Any such interest is outweighed 
by the presumption of innocence, relied on so heavily by 
Mitchell.  ―The government‘s interest in preventing crime by 
arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.‖  United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987).  Nevertheless, any 
assumption that an arrestee is ―more likely to commit crimes 
than other members of the public, without an individualized 
determination to that effect, is contradicted by the 
presumption of innocence. . . . Defendant is, after all, 
constitutionally presumed to be innocent pending trial . . . .‖  
United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006).  
That presumption instructs that the fact ―[t]hat an individual 
is charged with a crime cannot, as a constitutional matter, 
give rise to any inference that he is more likely than any other 
citizen to commit a crime if he is released from custody.  
Defendant is, after all, constitutionally presumed to be 
innocent pending trial, and innocence can only raise an 
inference of innocence, not of guilt.‖  Id.  Thus, in 
comparison to the probationer cases, the interests in 
supervision and prevention of recidivism are much 
diminished, if not absent, in the context of arrestees and 
pretrial detainees. 
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Mitchell draws our attention to a backlog in the analysis of 
DNA samples, the evidence he cites in support does not point 
to any backlog in the federal system. 
 
 Finally, we note that the other factors we identified in 
Sczubelek as weighing in favor of the reasonableness of the 
search apply with equal force in the present case.  While the 
DNA Act permits the Attorney General to collect DNA 
samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees, 42 U.S.C. § 
14135a(a)(1)(A), the implementing regulation mandates such 
collection, 28 C.F.R. § 28.12.  Thus, once the Attorney 
General has determined that DNA must be collected, there is 
no room for law enforcement officials to exercise (or abuse) 
discretion by deciding whether or not to collect a DNA 
sample.  Moreover, as we discussed more thoroughly above, 
the statutory structure contains safeguards to prevent the 
improper use of DNA profiles and to ensure the removal of 
DNA records from CODIS following a dismissal or an 
acquittal.  
 
 We therefore hold that 42 U.S.C. § 14315a is 
constitutional as applied to Mitchell.  For that reason, we also 
find that Mitchell‘s facial challenge to the statute fails.  
Because the statute is constitutional as applied to Mitchell, he 
has not shown that ―there is no set of circumstances‖ under 
which the statute may be applied constitutionally.
26
  In sum, 
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 There is a potential cause for concern with regard to the 
scope and breadth of 42 U.S.C. § 14315a.  As it is written, the 
statute applies, for example, to individuals arrested for federal 
misdemeanors.  However, Mitchell cannot raise a successful 
facial challenge to 42 U.S.C. § 14315a merely by arguing that 
it is overbroad.  See United States  v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 
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under the totality of the circumstances, given arrestees‘ and 
pretrial detainees‘ diminished expectations of privacy in their 
identities and the Government‘s legitimate interests in the 
collection of DNA from these individuals, we conclude that 
such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, the District Court incorrectly 
prohibited the Government from collecting a sample of 
Mitchell‘s DNA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14315a and 28 
C.F.R. § 28.12. 
 
V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court‘s grant of Mitchell‘s motion in opposition to pretrial 
DNA collection and the District Court‘s denial of the 
Government‘s motion for reconsideration.  We will remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
172 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011).  Outside of the First Amendment, 
potential overbreadth does not provide a means for striking 
down a statute.  See Artway v. Att’y Gen. of State of N.J., 81 
F.3d 1235, 1253 n.13 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Salerno, 481 
U.S. at 745 (―The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate 
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of 
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since 
we have not recognized an ‗overbreadth‘ doctrine outside the 
limited context of the First Amendment.‖) (citing Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.18 (1984)).  In Mitchell‘s case, 
any concerns about the scope of the statute dissipate in light 
of the fact that he was arrested and indicted for a serious drug 
offense.   
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges 
McKEE, Chief Judge, BARRY, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
VANASKIE join, and AMBRO joins as to Part II only, 
dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent because I find both of the 
majority‟s conclusions here – that we have jurisdiction over 
this appeal and that the Government‟s program of collecting, 
analyzing, and maintaining the DNA of arrestees and pretrial 
detainees comports with the Fourth Amendment – to be 
seriously flawed.  As to jurisdiction, the pretrial order from 
which the Government appeals falls squarely outside the 
narrow class of orders that warrant interlocutory appeal by the 
Government in criminal cases.  The Government‟s statutory 
interest in collecting and analyzing Mitchell‟s DNA 
implicated by the order is neither “important” in the 
jurisprudential sense required to justify such appeals, nor 
completely separate from the merits of Mitchell‟s case.   
 
With respect to the Fourth Amendment question, the 
majority gives short shrift to an arrestee‟s and pretrial 
detainee‟s expectation of privacy in his DNA, reducing it to 
an interest in identity only, and overstates the significance of 
the Government‟s interest in collecting evidence to solve 
crimes.  It reasons that limitations on the use of an arrestee‟s 
most personal information immunizes the Government from 
the Fourth Amendment‟s warrant requirement.  But this 
ignores the fact that the searches and seizure of one‟s DNA 
permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(1)(A) implicate privacy 
interests far more expansive than mere identity.  In the face of 
such heightened privacy interests, statutory restrictions on the 
use of the DNA collected from suspects who have not been 
convicted of a crime, though not wholly irrelevant, are not 
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panaceas.  They cannot offset the severe invasion of privacy 
that takes place when an arrestee‟s DNA is seized and 
searched.  And the intent of the Government in using 
arrestees‟ DNA to solve other crimes, while it may be 
salutary and helpful in that regard, is not compelling.  When 
the privacy and Government interests are weighted 
appropriately, one can only conclude that the Government‟s 
program of warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection from 
arrestees and pretrial detainees is fundamentally incompatible 
with the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
I. 
A. 
Our ability to review interlocutory appeals by the 
Government in criminal cases is extraordinarily restricted.  
The traditional limit on interlocutory appeals – the final-
judgment rule – is “„at its strongest in the field of criminal 
law,‟” where the accused (and society as a whole) have a 
strong interest in resolving criminal charges quickly.  
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984) (quoting 
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 
265 (1982)).  Although the collateral-order doctrine provides 
an exception to the final-judgment rule that may be applied in 
criminal cases, Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 403 
(1957), the Supreme Court requires that we “interpret[] the 
requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final 
judgment rule with the utmost strictness in criminal cases,” 
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265-66.  Heeding the Supreme Court‟s 
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mandate, the Courts of Appeals have only sparingly exercised 
jurisdiction over prejudgment appeals in criminal cases.
1
   
 
Our jurisdiction is further limited in this case because 
the Government, not the defendant, seeks review of the 
District Court‟s order.  As the majority itself recognizes, 
many criminal cases holding that interlocutory review is 
warranted implicate the rights of the defendant.  Maj. Op. 15.  
The exceptional instances where courts have exercised 
collateral-order jurisdiction over Government appeals in 
criminal cases involved substantial interests that would be 
lost without interlocutory review.  For instance, in United 
States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2001), we 
exercised interlocutory jurisdiction over a district-court order 
that leveled a wholesale challenge at the Government‟s right 
to be represented by the United States Attorney in the district 
of the prosecution.  In a similar case, United States v. Bolden, 
353 F.3d 870, 875-76 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained that an order disqualifying the 
United States Attorney‟s office “raises important separation 
                                                 
1
Although the majority relies heavily on cases 
involving post-judgment appeals, such as United States v. 
Peterson, 394 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2005), these cases are 
inapposite, as they present no risk that the Government‟s 
appeal will disrupt district court proceedings.  Cf. United 
States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“Moussaoui II”) (exercising collateral-order jurisdiction over 
an appeal of a post-judgment order because “accepting 
jurisdiction over the appeal in no way prolongs the 
Government‟s prosecution of Moussaoui, who has already 
been sentenced”). 
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of powers issues,” which “are undoubtedly jurisprudentially 
important,” especially because “disqualifying an entire United 
States Attorney‟s office is almost always reversible error.”2  
But in other cases, even those implicating “substantial 
national security concerns,” courts have declined to exercise 
interlocutory review.  See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 
333 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Moussaoui I”) (declining 
to exercise interlocutory jurisdiction over Government‟s 
appeal from a pretrial order, despite “substantial national 
security concerns” implicated by the order). 
 
B. 
To exercise jurisdiction under the collateral-order 
doctrine, we must find that the District Court‟s order 
“conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, resolve[s] 
an important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action, and [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment.”  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 473 U.S. 
463, 468 (1978).  If the order fails to satisfy any of these 
requirements, it is not an appealable collateral order.  We, Inc. 
v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 324 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citation omitted).   
                                                 
2
The majority also cites United States v. Santtini, 963 
F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1992), as a case in which we held that 
“interests asserted by the Government . . . are sufficiently 
important to merit interlocutory review.”  Maj. Op. 16.  But in 
Santtini, we specifically “refrain[ed] from hearing the 
government‟s appeal under section 1291” because we found 
that the order underlying the Government‟s appeal did not 
satisfy all of the collateral-order doctrine‟s requirements.  963 
F.2d at 592.   
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Construing these requirements strictly, as we must, I 
cannot agree with the majority that the order in this case 
“resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action.”  Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.  
As the majority correctly points out, this requirement contains 
“„two sub-requirements:  (a) the issue must be important; and 
(b) the issue must be completely separate from the merits of 
the action.‟”  Maj. Op. 15 (quoting United States v. Wecht, 
537 F.3d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)).  Neither is met in this 
case. 
 
First, it is not enough to conclude, in the abstract, that 
the Government‟s asserted interest is “important.”  To satisfy 
the collateral-order rule, we must satisfy ourselves that the 
Government‟s asserted right is “„important in a 
jurisprudential sense,‟” i.e., important enough to “„overcome 
the policies militating against interlocutory appeals.‟”  Praxis 
Props., Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 56 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citation omitted).  Few issues satisfy this stringent test.  
Some violations of constitutional rights qualify, see, e.g., 
Wecht, 537 F.3d at 231 (holding order restricting “the 
public‟s right of access to judicial proceedings” immediately 
appealable because that right “is a constitutional right of 
sufficient weight to permit the possibility of departing from 
ordinary final judgment principles” and “contemporaneous 
disclosure” of information pertaining to the trial would be lost 
if appeal were to be postponed); Abney v. United States, 431 
U.S. 651, 660 (1977) (orders denying motions to dismiss on 
double jeopardy grounds are immediately appealable because 
“the rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if 
appellate review of double jeopardy claims were postponed 
until after conviction and sentence”), but others do not.  Even 
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a defendant‟s right to interlocutory review is not automatic.  
For instance, despite the significance of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, an order disqualifying defense counsel “lacks 
the critical characteristics” of jurisprudential significance to 
merit interlocutory review.  Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266.  
Similarly, a defendant cannot obtain interlocutory review by 
claiming a violation of the right to a speedy trial, United 
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857 (1978), or a violation 
of grand jury secrecy rules, Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United 
States, 489 U.S. 794, 800-02 (1989), notwithstanding the 
constitutional import of those rules. 
 
In this case, the Government claims an interest that is 
of Congress‟s doing, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A), and is not 
“of constitutional stature.”  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. 
Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).  Though the 
Government‟s statutory authority to collect DNA samples 
from arrestees does, as the majority emphasizes, “„raise[] 
questions of clear constitutional importance,‟” Maj. Op. 16 
(quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003)), 
there is no long-standing recognition of this authority to 
collect DNA samples (forcibly, in some cases, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14135a(a)(4)), analyze them, and retain them indefinitely.  
Moreover, the constitutional significance is of importance to 
the defendant, not the Government.  No constitutional right is 
implicated by disallowing the taking of the defendant‟s DNA 
as occurred here.     
 
The majority suggests that Sell v. United States, 539 
U.S. 166 (2003), supports collateral-order jurisdiction over 
this case because of the constitutional importance of “the 
Government‟s interest in conducting reasonable searches for 
law enforcement purposes and individuals‟ rights to be free 
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from unreasonable searches.”  Maj. Op. 16.  But Sell was not 
so broad.  There, the Court upheld the exercise of collateral-
order jurisdiction over an appeal by the defendant from a 
pretrial order permitting the Government to administer 
medication to a criminal defendant without his permission.  
The dispositive issue was that, by the time a post-judgment 
appeal could be filed, “Sell will have undergone forced 
medication – the very harm that he seeks to avoid.”  539 U.S. 
at 176-77.  Since “involuntary medical treatment raises 
questions of clear constitutional importance,” interlocutory 
jurisdiction was appropriate.  Id. at 176.
3
  In Sell, unlike here, 
the defendant‟s rights were clearly at issue, and at risk.     
 
Here, by contrast, even if the District Court‟s order is 
wrong on the merits, no constitutional right will be forfeited if 
we do not exercise jurisdiction over the appeal.  The only 
harm will be to the Government‟s ability to take action 
prescribed by statute.  The majority fails to recognize this in 
its cursory appraisal of jurisprudential importance.    There is 
no “sever[e] . . . intrusion” upon the Government here, see 
Sell, 539 U.S. at 177; indeed, there is no intrusion upon the 
Government at all.  The intrusion upon Mitchell would be of 
constitutional import, but the impact on the Government‟s 
statutory prerogatives is not.  It also is of minimal practical 
significance.  If Mitchell is convicted, the Government will 
have the undisputed right to collect his DNA.  See United 
States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2005).  If he is 
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Similarly, an order allowing the Government to 
collect a defendant‟s DNA by force under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14135a(a)(4)(A) would raise constitutional concerns that 
would warrant interlocutory review of an appeal by the 
defendant.  But that is not the order before us in this case. 
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acquitted, he will be entitled by law to have the Government 
expunge his DNA profile from its CODIS database.  42 
U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii).   
 
Second, the issue here is not completely separate from 
the merits of the prosecution.  The majority dismisses 
Mitchell‟s concern in this regard by stating that “[n]othing in 
the record demonstrates that Mitchell‟s DNA will be an issue 
at trial or that the Government intends to compare Mitchell‟s 
DNA sample to DNA evidence collected from a crime scene. 
. . .”  Maj. Op. 19.  While that may be true, it ignores the fact 
that nothing prevents the Government from using Mitchell‟s 
DNA against him at trial.  See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2)(C) 
(providing that DNA samples and DNA analyses may be 
disclosed “in judicial proceedings”).  Indeed, the Government 
urges the Court to uphold the Government‟s right to collect a 
defendant‟s DNA before trial precisely because such 
evidence may prove useful to the prosecution of the crime for 
which the subject was arrested:  “Collection of a defendant‟s 
DNA fingerprints at or near the time of arrest serves 
important purposes relating directly to the arrest and ensuing 
proceedings.”  Gov‟t Br. 40 (emphasis added); see id. at 40-
41 (arguing that DNA collected before trial under 
§ 14135a(a)(1)(A) “functions to aid the Government in” 
carrying its burden of proof by “identifying the defendant” 
and providing additional information about “what that person 
has done”).  And the majority accepts the Government‟s 
argument in this regard, noting that the information coded in 
Mitchell‟s DNA has “important pretrial ramifications” and 
that the Government needs that information “as soon as 
possible” because “DNA profiling assists the Government in 
accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions,” including 
in the “investigation of the crime of arrest.”  Maj. Op. 59 
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(emphasis added).
4
  The Government‟s heightened interest in 
obtaining a defendant‟s DNA during the window of time 
between his arrest and his acquittal or conviction is based, at 
least in part, on its desire to use that DNA to help ascertain 
the defendant‟s identity as it relates to his guilt or innocence 
of the crime he is currently being charged with.  Thus, I 
cannot agree with the majority that the question of the 
Government‟s right to collect Mitchell‟s DNA is “completely 
separate from the merits of the action” when a key reason for 
allowing the Government to collect Mitchell‟s DNA is the 
potential for the Government to uncover information it can 
use in investigating and prosecuting the “crime of arrest.”   
 
                                                 
4
In addition, at oral argument the Government was 
asked whether the DNA collected before trial would be used 
to aid judges in determining whether to release pre-trial 
detainees on bail.  The Government replied in the affirmative.  
Indeed, one of the compelling interests identified by the 
Government is its interest in determining whether a person 
accused of a crime may have been involved in past criminal 
activity and, thus, may presently pose a danger to the 
community.  If the arrestee‟s DNA profile were to reveal such 
a history, a judge would want to factor this into his bail 
decision, creating another link to the merits of a defendant‟s 
prosecution.  See United States v. Abuhamara, 389 F.3d 309, 
323 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Bail hearings fit comfortably within the 
sphere of adversarial proceedings closely related to trial . . . . 
[B]ail hearings, like probable cause and suppression hearings, 
are frequently hotly contested and require a careful 
consideration of a host of facts about the defendant and the 
crimes charged.”).   
10 
 
Because this appeal does not “resolve an important 
issue” or pertain to an issue that is “completely separate from 
the merits of the action,” and because we must interpret the 
collateral-order doctrine “with the utmost strictness” in this 
case, we lack jurisdiction over the Government‟s appeal.  
Coopers & Lybrand, 473 U.S. at 468; Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 
266. 
 
II. 
In addressing the merits, the majority concludes that 
“the latest and most wide-reaching federal DNA collection 
act,” a statute that provides for the warrantless, suspicionless 
collection, analysis, and indexing of the DNA of federal 
arrestees and pretrial detainees – individuals who have not 
been convicted of a crime – does not present a Fourth 
Amendment problem.  Maj Op. 21.  I disagree.  The 
majority‟s holding means that if a person is arrested for a 
federal crime in a case of mistaken identity (an all-too-
common occurrence), the Government has the automatic right 
to sample the arrestee‟s DNA, to analyze it, and to include a 
profile derived from the DNA sample in CODIS.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A), (b).  Under the majority‟s holding, 
the arrestee has no way to protest or to prevent the 
Government from taking his DNA; his only recourse is to 
wait and later provide the Government with a “certified copy 
of a final court order establishing that” the charges against 
him have “been dismissed or [have] resulted in an acquittal,” 
or that “no charge was filed within the applicable time 
period.”  Id. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii).  Even then, although his 
DNA profile will be expunged from CODIS, the Government 
will retain his DNA sample indefinitely.  I simply cannot 
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imagine that our Government can so easily override a 
person‟s expectation of privacy in his DNA. 
 
The privacy interests of arrestees, while diminished in 
certain, very circumscribed situations, are not so weak as to 
permit the Government to intrude into their bodies and extract 
the highly sensitive information coded in their genes.  
Moreover, the Government‟s asserted interest in this case – 
the law enforcement objective of obtaining evidence to assist 
in the prosecution of past and future crimes – presents 
precisely the potential for abuse the Fourth Amendment was 
designed to guard against.  Thus, arrestees‟ and pretrial 
detainees‟ privacy interests in their DNA are stronger, and the 
Government‟s interest in evidence collection for crime-
solving purposes is less compelling, than the majority 
represents.  After distinguishing our holding in United States 
v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005), I will address these 
interests in turn. 
 
A. 
Sczubelek, which might appear to control this case, is 
readily distinguishable.  There, we held that the collection and 
analysis of DNA samples from individuals convicted of 
certain qualified federal offenses do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 187.  Thus, the key question in this case is 
whether Mitchell‟s status as an arrestee and pretrial detainee, 
as opposed to a convict, makes a difference that precludes the 
Government from sampling and analyzing his DNA.  It does.  
The factors on both sides of the totality-of-the-circumstances 
equation are different for arrestees and pretrial detainees than 
for convicted felons:  arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ 
expectation of privacy in their DNA is greater, and the 
12 
 
Government‟s interests in accessing and analyzing that DNA 
are much less compelling.
5
 
 
Convicts (whether prisoners or, as in Sczubelek, 
probationers) differ from arrestees and pretrial detainees in an 
obvious, but nonetheless critical, respect:  they have been 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not just accused, of a 
crime.  The conviction carries with it a permanent change in 
the person‟s status from ordinary citizen to “lawfully 
adjudicated criminal[] . . . whose proven conduct substantially 
heightens the government‟s interest in monitoring” him and 
“quite properly carries lasting consequences.”  United States 
v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(plurality op.).  Thus, it comes as no surprise that our analysis 
in Sczubelek turned on the defendant‟s conviction, not his 
mere arrest, on federal felony charges.  See 402 F.3d at 184-
85 (“After his conviction of a felony, [defendant‟s] identity 
became a matter of compelling interest to the government . . . 
.”) (emphasis added); see also Maj. Op. 49 (noting that our 
analysis in Sczubelek “relied heavily on Sczubelek‟s status as 
a convicted felon on supervised release”).  Because they have 
not been adjudged guilty of any crime or suffered any 
corresponding permanent change in their status, arrestees and 
                                                 
5
I agree with the majority that, following Sczubelek, 
we must apply the “totality of the circumstances” test to 
determine the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” of the 
contested search at issue in this case.  Maj. Op. 32-33.  But I 
share Judge McKee‟s concern that, when applied in these 
circumstances, such an analysis mimics a “special needs” 
analysis “while ignoring that the „need‟ relied upon is law 
enforcement.”  See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 199-201 (McKee, 
J., dissenting).   
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pretrial detainees necessarily retain a greater expectation of 
privacy than convicts do. 
 
At the same time, and as the majority concedes, 
several of the interests that tipped the balance in the 
Government‟s favor in Sczubelek do not carry the same force 
in this case.  For example, “the interests in supervising 
convicted individuals on release and deterring recidivism,” 
which we considered important in Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 186, 
“do not apply to arrestees or pretrial detainees,” Maj. Op. 56.  
The Government‟s interests in this case are limited by the fact 
that, unlike convicts, arrestees and pretrial detainees are 
entitled to a presumption of innocence.  Thus, unlike in 
Sczubelek, the Government may not assume that the subjects 
of the DNA collection are more likely to commit future 
crimes to justify the collection and analysis of their DNA.  
See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“That an individual is charged with a crime cannot, as a 
constitutional matter, give rise to any inference that he is 
more likely than any other citizen to commit a crime if he is 
released from custody.”), quoted in Maj. Op. 60 n.25.   
 
B. 
Accordingly, Sczubelek does not control.  Instead, our 
analysis must begin at the starting point for all Fourth 
Amendment inquiries:  an assessment of the privacy interests 
at stake.  See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 
(2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 
(1999)).   
 
Arrestees and pretrial detainees do not forfeit their 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections simply by virtue of 
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being arrested.  Courts have sanctioned government intrusion 
into those rights in only a few, narrow circumstances, such as 
searches of a suspect‟s person and the area within his 
immediate control incident to his arrest, see, e.g., Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), and prison searches for 
the purpose of “maintaining institutional security and 
preserving internal order and discipline,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979).  Neither circumstance exists in this 
case, and the majority does not suggest otherwise.  Instead, 
the majority premises its entire analysis on the theory that 
arrestees and pretrial detainees have a purported “diminished 
expectation of privacy in their identities.”  Maj. Op. 4.  But 
this minimizes, and misses, the point, in three ways:  (1) there 
is much more at stake in this case than arrestees‟ and pretrial 
detainees‟ expectation of privacy in their “identities”; (2) a 
person‟s DNA is not equivalent to his fingerprints; and (3) no 
persuasive authority supports the notion that arrestees and 
pretrial detainees enjoy less than a full expectation of privacy 
in their DNA. 
 
Before assessing the privacy interest at issue here, it is 
important to clarify the nature of the intrusion that takes place 
when a DNA sample is taken from an arrestee or pretrial 
detainee.  First, his cheek is swabbed.  This is the initial 
search.  The swab is followed by a taking – a seizure – of a 
sample of fluid containing DNA fluid.  The seizure is then 
followed by another search of the DNA and the creation from 
the retrieved sample of a profile.  And so, an arrestee or 
pretrial detainee undergoes three separate intrusions:  the 
search of his mouth, followed by a seizure of fluid, which is 
then searched in order to extract the desired end product, the 
DNA profile.   
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1. This Case Does Not Merely Concern 
Arrestees’ and Pretrial Detainees’ 
“Identities.” 
It is inaccurate to say that the only (or, indeed, even 
the primary) privacy concern at stake in this case is arrestees‟ 
and pretrial detainees‟ “identities.”  The real purpose of 
collecting arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ DNA samples and 
including the resulting DNA profiles in the federal CODIS 
database is not to “identify” the arrestee in the sense of 
allowing law enforcement to confirm that the correct person 
has been arrested or keeping records of who has been in 
federal custody, but to use those profiles and the information 
they provide as evidence in the prosecution and to solve 
additional past and future crimes.  See Gov‟t Br. 42-43 
(“Collection of DNA fingerprints at the time of arrest or at 
another early stage in the criminal justice process can solve, 
prevent, and deter subsequent criminal conduct . . . .”); see 
also Maj. Op. 24 (noting that CODIS “„allows State and local 
forensics laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles 
electronically in an attempt to link evidence from crime 
scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples . . . 
on file in the system‟” (quoting H.R. Rep. 106-900(I), at 8 
(2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324)); Maj. 
Op. 59 (“Collecting DNA samples from arrestees can speed 
both the investigation of the crime of arrest and the solution 
of any past crime for which there is a match in CODIS.”).  
Indeed, to my mind,“[t]he collection of a DNA sample . . . 
does not „identify‟ an [arrestee or pretrial detainee] any more 
than a search of his home does – it merely collects more and 
more information about that [arrestee or pretrial detainee] that 
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can be used to investigate unsolved past or future crimes.”  
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 857 n.16 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
6
   
 
The structure of the statute and accompanying 
regulatory scheme confirm that the statute‟s animating 
purpose is not to identify the defendant.  The statute provides 
for expungement of an arrestee‟s or pretrial detainee‟s DNA 
profile if the charges do not result in a conviction or if the 
Government fails to file charges within the applicable period.  
42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii).  If the Government‟s real 
interest were in maintaining records of arrestees‟ identities, 
there would be no need to expunge those records upon an 
acquittal or failure to file charges against the arrestee.  
Indeed, this statutory provision serves as an admission that 
the fact of conviction, not of mere arrest, justifies a finding 
that an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy in 
his DNA. 
 
Other features of the regulatory scheme further 
undermine the majority‟s conclusion that the relevant privacy 
concern here is arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ expectation 
                                                 
6
In Sczubelek, we used the concepts of “identity” and 
“identifying information” interchangeably.  See 402 F.3d at 
184-85 (reasoning that, because convicted offenders cannot 
assert a privacy interest in photographs and fingerprints as 
“means of identification” they also must forfeit their interests 
in the “identifying information” provided by their DNA).  But 
I submit that there is an important distinction between these 
two concepts.  It is the identifying information about the 
defendant, not his identity as such, that interests the 
Government in his DNA.  Only through the use of that 
identifying information will additional crimes be solved. 
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of privacy in their “identities.”  The statute and regulations 
contemplate collection of a DNA sample and analysis of that 
sample to create a “DNA profile,” which is then entered into 
CODIS.
7
  The Government retains the full DNA sample 
indefinitely.
8
  The arrestee‟s or pretrial detainee‟s intact, 
unanalyzed DNA sample contains a “„vast amount of 
sensitive information,‟” Maj. Op. 42 (quoting United States v. 
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2007)), beyond the 
individual‟s identity, including “familial lineage and 
predisposition to over four thousand types of genetic 
conditions and diseases” and, potentially, “genetic markers 
                                                 
7
Although the majority considers the collection of the 
DNA sample and its subsequent analysis to create the DNA 
profile together, the majority and the Government 
acknowledge that both are constitutionally significant 
searches subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  Gov‟t Br. 
21-22; Maj. Op. 35-36; see also Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 182 
(quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 616 (1989)).  As discussed above, three separate 
instances of search or seizure occur throughout the DNA 
collection and analysis process authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 
14135(a)(1)(A).      
 
8
The statute provides for the expungement of DNA 
profiles from CODIS under certain circumstances, see 42 
U.S.C § 14132(d)(1), but does not provide any mechanism for 
the disposal of the DNA samples.  The Government states 
that, “if the conditions for expungement of a DNA profile 
under § 14132(d)(1) are satisfied, the FBI disposes of the 
DNA sample from which it was derived as well,” Gov‟t 
Reply Br. 22, but does not cite any authority to support that 
assertion. 
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for traits including aggression, sexual orientation, substance 
addiction, and criminal tendencies,” United States v. Mitchell, 
681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).  
The majority suggests that the “possible misuse and future 
use of DNA samples” is a matter of conjecture, Maj. Op. 45, 
but that seeks to divert from the issue at hand.  Misuse and 
future use notwithstanding, the Government has taken, 
searched, and retained rich, privacy-laden DNA in the 
sample.  The majority‟s focus on the Government‟s use of 
that DNA as the controlling privacy consideration is simply 
misguided.  It is akin to saying that if the Government seizes 
personal medical information about you but can only use the 
subset of that information that serves to identify you, your 
privacy interest in the information taken is confined to a mere 
interest in your identity.  Nothing could be further from the 
truth, and the majority engages in sleight of hand by 
suggesting otherwise.        
 
The majority does not even attempt to support its 
thesis that arrestees and pretrial detainees have a diminished 
expectation of privacy in this extremely private and sensitive 
information.  Instead, it avoids this issue by theorizing that 
statutory safeguards concerning the post-collection use of the 
samples validate, or justify, their earlier warrantless 
collection.  Maj. Op. 42-44.  But where in our jurisprudence 
have we held that post-collection safeguards on the use of 
seized material can immunize an otherwise impermissible 
search?  It bears repeating that a seizure and two invasive 
searches have already taken place before any question of the 
DNA sample‟s use even comes into play.  The majority‟s 
emphasis on use to define – in fact, to cabin – the nature of 
the interest is not supportable in law or logic.   
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With these concerns in mind, it is little comfort that 
only so-called “junk DNA” is used to compile a suspect‟s 
DNA profile.  As our colleagues from the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals have pointed out, “with advances in technology, 
junk DNA may reveal far more extensive genetic 
information.”  United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 
(9th Cir. 2007).  Indeed, studies already “have begun to 
question the notion that junk DNA does not contain useful 
genetic programming material,” Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818 n.6 
(plurality op.) (citation omitted); see also id. at 849-50 
(Reinhardt., J., dissenting) (citing additional studies).  
Contrary to the majority, which dismisses these concerns as 
“hypothetical possibilities . . . unsupported by the record 
before us,” Maj. Op. 45, we believe we should not be blind to 
the potential for abuse when assessing the legitimacy of 
government action.   These concerns are legitimate and real, 
and should be taken into account in considering the totality of 
the circumstances in this case. 
 
2. DNA Is Not the Same as Fingerprints or 
Photographs. 
 
Taking an arrestee‟s picture or fingerprints does not 
provide a useful analogy for analyzing the question of 
whether the Government may collect and analyze his DNA.  
See Maj. Op. 46-53.  To the contrary, “[t]he seizure and 
indefinite storage of the [DNA] sample, which is what . . . the 
government must justify under a Fourth Amendment 
exception, is very different from fingerprinting and other 
traditional booking procedures.”  See United States v. Pool, 
621 F.3d 1213, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010) (Schroeder, J., 
dissenting). 
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For one thing, collecting and analyzing DNA is much 
more intrusive than either fingerprinting or photographing.  
As noted above, the DNA samples the Government seeks to 
extract contain far more than the mere identifying information 
that can be gleaned from a suspect‟s fingerprints or mug shot.  
And whereas the science surrounding DNA is still evolving 
(and may even be said to be in its early stages), we know that 
the potential to use fingerprints and mug shots for purposes 
other than identification is limited.  Moreover, and quite 
obviously, the collection of a person‟s DNA “„requires 
production of evidence below the body surface which is not 
subject to public view,‟” whereas fingerprinting and 
photographing do not.  Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 197-98 
(McKee, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Mills, 686 F.2d 135, 
139 (3d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added)).  While the Supreme 
Court, and we, have held in some circumstances that blood 
tests or other bodily intrusions constitute a “minimal” 
invasion of an individual‟s privacy interests, see Maj. Op. 34-
35 & cases cited therein, we should not dismiss any such 
intrusion lightly, cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
770 (1966) (“The importance of informed, detached and 
deliberate determinations of the issue of whether or not to 
invade another‟s body in search of evidence of guilt is 
indisputable and great.”); Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184 (noting 
that even the “slight intrusion” of a blood test is 
“unconstitutional” when required of “an ordinary citizen”).   
 
At the same time, the Government‟s interest in 
collecting fingerprints and photographs is stronger than its 
interest in collecting and analyzing DNA.  In the case of 
photographs and fingerprints, the Government‟s primary 
interest is to “identify” suspects in the traditional sense, i.e., 
to “ensure[] that the person who has been arrested is in fact 
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the person law enforcement agents believe they have in 
custody.”  United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 
1113 (10th Cir. 2006).  But with respect to DNA, the 
Government‟s primary objective is to solve crimes.  I agree 
with the majority that the Government‟s interest in 
identifying individuals who have been arrested can be strong; 
where we part company is in the majority‟s conclusion that it 
justifies the warrantless collection and analysis of DNA, 
which contains much more than just identifying information. 
 
3. No Persuasive Authority Supports the 
Conclusion that Arrestees and Pretrial 
Detainees Have a Diminished Expectation of 
Privacy in Their DNA. 
Even if arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ expectation of 
privacy in their identities were the relevant privacy interest in 
this case, the caselaw concerning arrestees‟ and pretrial 
detainees‟ reduced expectation of privacy in their identities is 
not nearly as broad or clear-cut as the majority suggests.   
 
The majority relies heavily on cases that approve the 
use of fingerprinting arrestees and pretrial detainees as part of 
routine “booking procedures.”  See Maj. Op. 49-52.  
Fingerprinting does not provide a useful analogue in this case 
for the reasons outlined above.  Even leaving that aside, 
however, I disagree that the “booking procedures” cases carry 
the weight the majority assigns to them.  As the majority 
concedes, most modern cases on the subject “assume the 
propriety of such booking procedures with little analysis.”  
Maj. Op. 49 n.20; see, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 
879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“[I]t is elementary that a person in 
lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing . . 
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. and fingerprinting . . . as part of routine identification 
processes.” (citations omitted)).  That is particularly true of 
cases that proclaim that the Government has an interest in 
using those fingerprints for solving past and future crimes 
unrelated to the suspect‟s arrest – they tend simply to state 
that “we accept” those practices as a truism, without any 
further citation or analysis.  See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 
F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating, without citation to 
authority, “[w]e accept” routine fingerprinting “because the 
identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the 
crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for 
maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future 
crimes”).   
 
Where courts analyze the reasons we allow routine 
fingerprinting in any detail, they typically rely on one of two 
justifications:  (a) that the evidence may be used to solve the 
particular crime for which the government has probable cause 
to arrest the suspect or (b) that the Government has a general 
interest in what the majority describes as the first 
“component” of a person‟s identity  –  “„who that person 
is.‟”9  Maj. Op. 59 (quoting Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 
                                                 
9
The Supreme Court employed the former justification 
in Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (cited in Maj. Op. 
51), when it expressed support “for the view that the Fourth 
Amendment would permit seizures for the purpose of 
fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis 
for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the 
suspect’s connection with that crime, and if the procedure is 
carried out with dispatch,” id. at 817 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added).  United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 
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2d 1187, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009)).  Both justifications make 
sense and may be true in a limited context, but neither one 
explains why the Government may collect identifying 
information expressly for the purpose of using it against 
arrestees in connection with other, unsolved crimes for which 
the Government has no basis to suspect the arrestee.   
 
The majority seems to take additional comfort in the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals‟ recent holding in United 
States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010),
10
 that a judicial 
or grand jury determination of probable cause that an 
individual has committed a crime provides a “legitimate 
reason” for finding that pretrial releasees have a diminished 
expectation of privacy in their DNA.  Maj. Op. 30-32; see 
also Pool, 621 F.3d at 1220 (“[I]t is doubtful that Pool, or any 
other individual having been indicted by a grand jury or 
having been subjected to a judicial determination of probable 
                                                                                                             
F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2006), provides a good example of the 
latter justification.  In that case, the court explained, 
“[f]ingerprinting ensures that the person who has been 
arrested is in fact the person law enforcement agents believe 
they have in custody,” and “[t]he government always has the 
right, and indeed the obligation, to know who it is that they 
hold in custody regardless of whether the arrest is later 
determined to be illegal,” Id. at 1113 (emphases added).   
 
10
As the majority noted, the Ninth Circuit voted on 
June 2, 2011 to rehear Pool en banc.  In granting rehearing, 
the Ninth Circuit ordered that the three-judge panel opinion 
shall not “be cited as binding precedent by or to any court of 
the Ninth Circuit.”  United States v. Pool, --- F.3d ---, 2011 
WL 215102, at *1 (9th Cir. June 2, 2011).    
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cause, has any right to withhold his or her true identification 
from the government.”).   
 
I do not find the reasoning of Pool to be applicable 
here.  As an initial matter, Pool “condones DNA testing for 
individuals for whom a judicial or grand jury probable cause 
determination has been made; it does not address such 
sampling from mere arrestees.”  Id. at 1231 (Lucero, J., 
concurring).  The majority glosses over that distinction, 
announcing the much broader holding that the probable-cause 
requirement “inherent in the statute,” which presumably 
incorporates an arresting officer‟s finding of probable cause 
in addition to findings by a judge or grand jury, is enough to 
support a diminution in an arrestee‟s or pretrial detainee‟s 
expectation of privacy in his DNA.  See Maj. Op. 53 n.22.  
The majority never explains why that is the case. 
 
Moreover, Pool, like most fingerprinting cases, never 
explains why a finding of probable cause in connection with a 
particular crime justifies the collection of DNA profiles for 
use in connection with other crimes for which, by definition, 
there has been no finding of probable cause or, indeed, any 
suspicion at all.  I am not persuaded by the concurring 
opinion‟s reasoning that a prior “probable cause 
determination limits the opportunities for mischief inherent in 
a suspicionless search regime.”  Pool, 621 F.3d at 1231-32 
(Lucero, J., concurring).  We do not view a finding of 
probable cause for one crime as sufficient justification to 
engage in warrantless searches of arrestees‟ or pretrial 
detainees‟ homes for evidence of other crimes, see, e.g., 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (holding that, absent a search 
warrant, there is “no . . . justification” for searching an area 
not within a suspect‟s immediate control during an arrest), or 
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even for purposes of identification, see, e.g., Hayes, 470 U.S. 
at 817 (“[N]either reasonable suspicion nor probable cause 
would suffice to permit . . . officers to make a warrantless 
entry into a person‟s house for the purpose of obtaining 
fingerprint identification”).  Indeed, even after conviction, 
warrantless searches raise serious Fourth Amendment 
questions.  Where the Supreme Court has upheld such 
searches, it has focused on non-law enforcement “special 
needs,” as in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 
(1987), or “reasonable suspicion” that the subject of the 
search “is engaged in criminal activity,” as in United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).  Neither circumstance 
exists in this case. 
 
In light of the foregoing, I do not find any authority to 
support a general diminution of arrestees‟ or pretrial 
detainees‟ privacy interests by virtue of a finding of probable 
cause.  Absent such authority, there is no basis for concluding 
that arrestees‟ or pretrial detainees‟ expectation of privacy in 
their DNA is diminished in any way. 
 
C. 
Acknowledging that the Government‟s interests in 
“supervising convicted individuals on release and deterring 
recidivism do not apply to arrestees or pretrial detainees,” the 
majority rests its approval of the DNA collection scheme at 
issue here entirely on the Government‟s interest in “collecting 
identifying information to aid law enforcement.”  Maj. Op. 
56.  In so doing, the majority seems to have lost sight of the 
Fourth Amendment‟s inherent strictures. 
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The Fourth Amendment provides: 
 
The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  “Ordinarily, the reasonableness of a 
search depends on governmental compliance with the 
Warrant Clause, which requires authorities to demonstrate 
probable cause to a neutral magistrate and thereby convince 
him to provide formal authorization to proceed with a search 
by issuance of a particularized warrant.”  Kincade, 379 F.3d 
at 822 (plurality op.) (citation omitted).   
 
Throughout the years, courts have approved exceptions 
to the warrant and probable-cause requirements in certain 
carefully defined circumstances, such as searches incident to 
arrest, see, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, limited, protective 
searches based on “reasonable suspicion” of imminent 
danger, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), and 
generalized prison searches to further legitimate penological 
goals, e.g., Florence v. Burlington Cnty., 621 F.3d 296, 307 
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding certain jails‟ strip-search procedures 
reasonable in light of the jails‟ interests in maintaining 
security).  See generally Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822-24 
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(surveying exceptions to warrant and probable-cause 
requirements).  But, given the express warrant and probable-
cause requirements in the Fourth Amendment‟s text, we must 
take special care when approving warrantless, suspicionless 
searches to ensure that our analysis is well grounded in the 
facts and law and that it makes jurisprudential and common 
sense.   
 
Our task in Fourth Amendment cases is not to 
determine whether some asserted government interest might 
theoretically provide a rational basis for the challenged 
search.  The majority‟s conclusion that the government 
interest here is somehow sufficient does just that, and thereby 
transforms the analysis into one that is more akin to First 
Amendment reasoning.
11
  But there is no “rational basis” 
principle in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
The Supreme Court historically has regarded 
generalized interests in “law enforcement” as a particularly 
suspect type of government interest for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, and has specifically held invalid other suspicionless 
search programs that are designed to “uncover evidence of 
ordinary criminal wrongdoing” by the targets of the search.  
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000); see 
also, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 
(2001) (invalidating hospital program, developed with police 
                                                 
11
In First Amendment cases, our task is first to 
determine whether the challenged government action 
infringes a fundamental right protected by the Amendment.  
If the statute does not do so, the federal or state government 
“need only demonstrate a rational basis to justify” it.  Ysursa 
v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1098, 1098 (2009). 
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involvement, of drug testing pregnant women and turning 
over evidence of drug use to law enforcement for use in 
prosecutions because “the immediate objective of the 
searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement 
purposes”) (emphasis in original); see generally Sczubelek, 
402 F.3d at 190-97 (McKee, J., dissenting) (providing 
comprehensive overview of Supreme Court precedent in this 
area); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 854 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) 
(“Never once in over two hundred years of history has the 
Supreme Court approved of a suspicionless search designed 
to produce ordinary evidence of criminal wrongdoing by the 
police.”); cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-24 (2004) 
(holding that searches or seizures designed to elicit 
information about a particular crime “in all likelihood 
committed by others” are constitutional, unlike those 
designed to determine whether the particular individuals 
stopped are “committing a crime”).12  This treatment 
                                                 
12
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
Lidster supports its determination that a New York DNA 
collection statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment, 
classifying the DNA collection program as an “information-
seeking,” rather than a “crime detection” search.  Nicholas v. 
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2005).  Respectfully, I 
disagree.  Unlike in Lidster, where the Court stressed that the 
search sought information from “members of the public for 
their help in providing information about a crime in all 
likelihood committed by others,” 540 U.S. at 423, the scheme 
at issue in this case searches arrestees for the very purpose of 
determining whether they – not “others” – are “possibly 
implicated in other crimes,” Maj. Op. 59.  The vast program 
of DNA profiling at issue in this case cannot be characterized 
as simply “information-seeking,” and neither the Government 
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comports with basic notions of the role the Fourth 
Amendment plays in protecting the lives of ordinary citizens.  
See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 851-52 (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (“[The Framers] knew that the use of 
suspicionless blanket searches and seizures for investigatory 
purposes would „subject unlimited numbers of innocent 
persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to 
involuntary detention.‟” (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 
U.S. 721, 726 (1969)).  
 
The majority ignores all of this context and accepts at 
face value the notion that the public interest in prosecuting 
crime is a “key interest” that, without more, justifies the 
Government‟s collection and analysis of arrestees‟ and 
pretrial detainees‟ DNA.  See Maj. Op. 56-61.  However, in 
light of the Fourth Amendment‟s text and the Supreme 
Court‟s guidance in interpreting it, the Government‟s interest 
in evidence-gathering and crime-solving deserves little or no 
weight in our Fourth Amendment review.  Even were we to 
assume some diminution in arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ 
expectation of privacy in their DNA, the Government cannot 
trump that expectation simply by invoking its interest in 
solving crimes.   
                                                                                                             
nor the majority even attempts to justify it on that ground.  
Instead, like the program the Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional in Edmond, the Government‟s DNA 
collection and analysis program here is justified “only by the 
generalized and ever-present possibility that” including the 
seized DNA in CODIS “may reveal that any given [arrestee 
or pretrial detainee] has committed some crime.”  531 U.S. at 
44. 
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Of course, the Government‟s interest in solving past 
and future crimes is a legitimate and serious one.  But if that 
were our only concern, we would authorize the collection and 
inclusion in CODIS of DNA profiles of every citizen – surely, 
that would “assist[ ] the Government in accurate criminal 
investigations and prosecutions.”  Maj. Op. 59.  Similarly, if 
we hold that this interest prevails over some inchoate 
“diminished expectation of privacy,” then we may be opening 
the door to the collection and analysis of DNA for crime-
solving purposes from the “many other groups of people 
who,” under Supreme Court precedent, “have a reduced 
expectation of privacy,” including, e.g., “students who attend 
public schools and participate in extracurricular activities” 
and “drivers and passengers of vehicles.”  Sczubelek, 402 
F.3d at 198-99 (McKee, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see 
also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) 
(“Under the test the plurality employs, any person who 
experiences a reduction in his expectation of privacy would 
be susceptible to having his blood sample extracted and 
included in CODIS – attendees of public high schools or 
universities, persons seeking to obtain drivers‟ licenses, 
applicants for federal employment, or persons requiring any 
form of federal identification, and those who desire to travel 
by airplane, just to name a few.”).  Routine searches of 
arrestees‟ homes would also be permitted as furthering the 
Government‟s legitimate crime-solving interests. 
 
The absurdity of these examples underscores that the 
Government‟s crime-solving interests, while compelling in 
the abstract, cannot carry the day here.  Warrantless searches 
require so much more.  I do not agree with the majority that 
arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ expectation of privacy in 
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their DNA yields so easily to the Government‟s generalized 
evidence-collection and crime-solving concerns. 
 
D. 
 
It should also be noted that the Court has before it a 
facial challenge to § 14135(a)(1)(A) and its implementing 
regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 28.12, not an as-applied challenge.  
The statute and the regulation are unconstitutional on their 
face, satisfying even the most stringent standard for a facial 
challenge.  This standard, announced in United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), requires that the party 
asserting the challenge “must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”13  
                                                 
13
In reciting this test for a facial challenge, the majority 
fails to mention the uncertainty of its continuing vitality.  In 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999), a 
plurality of the Court explained that, “[t]o the extent we have 
consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, 
it is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the 
decisive factor in any decision in this Court, including 
Salerno itself.”  See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 740 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I do not believe 
the Court has ever actually applied such a strict standard [as 
no set-of-circumstances], even in Salerno itself, and the Court 
does not appear to apply Salerno here.”).  Most recently, the 
Court has analyzed facial challenges under both the Salerno 
standard and the less rigorous rule “that a facial challenge 
must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.”  
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 
U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(noting that “some Members of the Court have criticized the 
32 
 
The test is met here.  No set of circumstances exists under 
which a statute and regulation mandating DNA collection for 
all arrestees and pre-trial detainees can be constitutionally 
valid.         
 
The majority approaches the apparent ambiguity in the 
nature of Mitchell‟s challenge by, it says, considering both an 
as-applied and a facial challenge to the statute.  However, 
what it refers to as its analysis of Mitchell‟s “as-applied” 
challenge is, in fact, an analysis of whether the statute is 
constitutional on its face.  In balancing Mitchell‟s and the 
Government‟s interests, the majority speaks in sweeping and 
general terms.
14
  Aside from a few semantic nods, nothing in 
                                                                                                             
Salerno formulation” and holding that Washington state law 
governing primary elections “survives under either 
standard.”).  Mitchell‟s challenge meets the Court‟s most 
exacting standard, but it is unclear whether that is even 
required for him to prevail.     
   
14
 For example, it describes the intrusions at issue as 
“the act of collecting DNA” and “the processing of the DNA 
sample and creation of the DNA profile for CODIS,” not as 
collecting a particular person‟s DNA under particular 
circumstances.  Maj. Op. 42.  It finds that Mitchell‟s privacy 
argument is unavailing “in light of the restrictions built into 
the DNA profiling process,” suggesting that the process writ 
large – not the particular process that Mitchell underwent – is 
constitutionally sound.  Similarly, it explains the 
Government‟s interests in general terms.  The Government‟s 
alleged interest in identifying arrestees, the majority says, 
justifies the statute itself, not the statute as it is applied to 
Mitchell.  Maj. Op. 56-61.   
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its “as applied” analysis looks at the DNA Act as applied to 
Mitchell in particular.  Instead, it evaluates the general 
question of whether it is constitutional to collect DNA from 
federal arrestees and pretrial detainees.  See United States v. 
Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (“An as-applied 
attack . . . does not contend that law is unconstitutional as 
written but that its application to a particular person under 
particular circumstances deprives that person of a 
constitutional right.”).  The majority concludes from this 
analysis that 42 U.S.C. § 14315(a) is constitutional as applied 
to Mitchell and, therefore, as this represents a circumstance in 
which the statute can be applied constitutionally, that Mitchell 
cannot meet the “no set of circumstances” test for a facial 
challenge.  Maj. Op. 61-62.  The majority‟s mislabeling of its 
facial analysis as an as-applied analysis is, thus, 
inconsequential in the end, but nonetheless perplexing.  As an 
effort to confine its far-reaching holding, it fails.   
 
Regardless of how Mitchell‟s challenge to 42 U.S.C. § 
14315(a) was formulated, the statute and its implementing 
regulation are facially unconstitutional.  They require 
warrantless, suspicionless collection of DNA from the bodies 
of all arrestees and pre-trial detainees.  There is no set of 
circumstances under which this requirement, i.e., that all 
arrestees are to be swabbed, can be said to be constitutional.  
Its blanket mandate contradicts basic and essential Fourth 
Amendment principles.   
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, as I would affirm 
the District Court‟s order. 
